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ABSTRACT 
In the United States, retirement income and health insurance are 
largely provided through private promises made incident to employment. 
These “benefit promises” are governed by a statute called ERISA, which 
many health care and pension scholars argue is the cause of fundamental 
problems with our nation’s health and retirement policy. Inevitably, 
however, they advance narrowly tailored proposals to amend the statute. 
This occurs because of the widely held view that reform should leave 
undisturbed the underlying core of the statute. This Article develops a 
theory of ERISA designed to illustrate the unavoidable need for structural 
reform. 
 
 
  Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School; 
A.B. Stanford University. 
 Visiting Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School; Principal, Stris & Maher LLP; J.D. 
Harvard Law School; B.A. University of Pennsylvania. 
 This Article was prompted and made possible by our litigation of three major ERISA cases before 
the United States Supreme Court. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (argued by 
Professor Stris on January 20, 2010), LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1020 
(2008) (argued by Professor Stris on November 26, 2007), and Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 
547 U.S. 356 (2006) (argued by Professor Stris on March 28, 2006); see also Linda Greenhouse, Top 
Court Allows Suit Over 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at C1 (―With 70 million people holding 
about $3 trillion in 401(k) investments, the 9-to-0 decision [in LaRue] was one of the most important 
rulings in years on the meaning of the federal pension law . . . .‖). During this process, many have 
generously shared their time. We are extremely grateful to have had the opportunity to discuss our 
ideas with experts at the Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute, the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Labor, the Pension Rights Center, the American Health 
Lawyers Association, the National Employment Lawyers Association, Public Citizen, and AARP. We 
have benefited immensely from discussions about ERISA with many of our colleagues in the academy 
including Professors Donald Bogan, Eric Chason, Jonathan Forman, David Pratt, Paul Secunda, 
Andrew Stumpff, James A. Wooten, and Edward Zelinsky. We thank Professor Norman Stein in 
particular for his extensive written comments on early drafts of this Article. And we are ever indebted 
to Madelaine Behr for her invaluable research assistance. All errors are ours alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than other developed nations, the United States relies on private 
promises to assure health and retirement security.
1
 These promises involve 
―employee benefits.‖ They are subsidized by the first- and third-largest tax 
expenditures in the federal budget.
2
 And they are heavily regulated by a 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Teresa Ghilarducci & Christian E. Weller, Issues Still Facing Employer-Based 
Pensions, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, & POSSIBILITIES 1, 1 (Teresa Ghilarducci & 
Christian E. Weller eds., 2007) (―The U.S. stands apart from developed market economies in relying 
heavily on individual employers to achieve the common goal of securing retirement income for 
American workers.‖). 
 2. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and 
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (1991) (―[T]he system of tax subsidies to employer 
pensions . . . is the federal government‘s largest tax expenditure.‖). In recent years, the pension 
subsidy referred to by Professor Weiss has been eclipsed by a related one. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2009, at 298 tbl.19-3 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy09/pdf/ 
spec.pdf (noting that the largest tax expenditure in 2008 was the ―exclusion of employer contributions 
for medical insurance premiums and medical care,‖ which cost the federal government more than $168 
billion in revenue).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/3
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landmark statute known as ERISA.
3
 In this Article, we develop a theory of 
uncertainty designed to evaluate ERISA and its regulation of the benefit 
promise.
4
 
To set the stage, employee benefits come in varying forms. They 
include traditional monthly pensions,
5
 401(k) contributions,
6
 and the 
payment of health insurance premiums.
7
 As economists have long noted, 
these benefits are wage substitutes.
8
 In other words, the promise of 
benefits entails a corresponding reduction in salary. No one disputes, 
therefore, that these promises should be secure, understood by both 
parties, and not too costly to make or administer. But legal rules that 
promote security and clarity may render benefit promises more costly; in 
other words, rules may have both desirable and undesirable consequences, 
and a given rule‘s ultimate desirability will virtually always require the 
assessment and balancing of competing concerns regarding security, 
clarity, and cost. 
We argue that the most useful way to compare alternatives—both in 
terms of prospective rule selection and retrospective rule evaluation—is to 
frame the inquiry in terms of context-specific uncertainty. Economists 
have long recognized the power of such framing in making difficult 
choices between competing legal rules.
9
 More recently, this mode of 
 
 
 3. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). ERISA regulates ―employee pension 
benefit plans.‖ 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). Today, such plans hold more than $5.2 trillion in 
assets. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUND ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, THIRD QUARTER 2009, at 77 (2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/20091210/z1.pdf. ERISA also regulates ―employee welfare 
benefit plans.‖ 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). Today, a staggering percentage of health-care expenditures 
are paid with insurance provided by such plans. See infra notes 85, 87 (describing the explosive, and 
largely unanticipated, growth of employer-sponsored health insurance). 
 4. As one prominent health-care scholar recently noted, there is ―an emerging body of work in 
legal theory . . . that examines how the framework of risk has developed into an explanatory model.‖ 
Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 n.3 
(2008) (citing JENNY STEELE, RISKS AND LEGAL THEORY (2004); Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, 
Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
1 (2002); Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledge of Risks, in LAW AND RISK 86, 87 (2005)). For 
ease of reference, the remainder of this paper will use the term ―uncertainty‖ to refer to both risk and 
uncertainty. See infra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text (defining risk and uncertainty, respectively). 
 5. See infra Part II.A (discussing the ―defined benefit‖ pension). 
 6. See infra Part II.B (discussing the ―defined contribution‖ pension). 
 7. See infra Part II.C (discussing employer-sponsored group health insurance). Our three-item 
list is not exhaustive. Other significant benefits include, for example, severance and disability benefits, 
but in this Article we have chosen to focus on pensions and health insurance. 
 8. See infra Part I (explaining the wage-substitute theory of benefits).  
 9. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
With Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984) (―analyz[ing] some ways in which uncertainty 
about the application of legal standards can give parties economic incentives to ‗overcomply‘ or to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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analysis has been employed by legal scholars to explain and evaluate 
specific areas such as commercial contracts,
10
 property rights,
11
 and 
criminal plea negotiations.
12
 In our view, a similar approach is sorely 
needed in the ERISA context, where existing scholarly and judicial 
debates often suffer from a profoundly undertheorized conception of the 
benefit promise and its regulation. 
To be sure, there will always be disagreement regarding whether, and 
how, government should provide, subsidize, or regulate pension and 
health-care benefits.
13
 At the same time, thoughtful examination of 
existing policy often reveals areas in which some intervention is 
necessary.
14
 Broad thinking is essential because, as ERISA scholars have 
long observed, the stakes are high.
15
 
 
 
‗undercomply‘‖ with legal rules); F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on 
Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 205, 205 (1999) (examining ―how judicial independence affects uncertainty about judicial 
decisions‖ and ―illustrat[ing] the link between the uncertainty surrounding court decisions and rates of 
litigation through an adaptation of the well-known Priest and Klein model‖).  
 10. See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 755 (2009) (arguing that uncertainty explains the use of material adverse events clauses 
rather than price adjustments). 
 11. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2008) (exploring ―[w]hat impact, if any,‖ a property owner‘s 
uncertainty about the scope of her rights should have on the remedies available to her against 
encroaching users). 
 12. See, e.g., Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1995 (2006) (arguing that higher ambiguity aversion of defendants, as opposed to 
prosecutors, results in unbalanced plea negotiations).  
 13. See, e.g., Alexander S. Preker et al., Private Participation in Supporting the Social Contact in 
Health: New Insights from Institutional Economics, in RECENT HEALTH POLICY INNOVATIONS IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY 209 (Aviva Ron & Xenia Scheil-Adlung eds., 2001); Lawrence H. Summers, Some 
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (1989) (summarizing the 
relative preferences of liberals and conservatives). 
 14. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in 
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844 (2009) (arguing that, because of federal 
expenditures such as the tax subsidy for employer-sponsored health insurance, there is a need for 
federal intervention in medical malpractice reform); Michele Varnhagen, U.S. Federal Pension Policy: 
Its Potential and Pitfalls, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, & POSSIBILITIES 163, 181 
(Teresa Ghilarducci & Christian E. Weller eds., 2007) (noting, regrettably, that ―[i]n recent years when 
Social Security has been under review . . . , Social Security aficionados were loathe to add private 
pension and savings issues to the debate‖).  
 15. See generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974, A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004) [hereinafter WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY]; John Bronsteen, 
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United 
States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297 (2008); Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of 
Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1 (2000); Norman 
Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (1993); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, 
ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311 (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/3
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The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we argue that benefit 
promises necessarily implicate three species of uncertainty—
(i) performance uncertainty (i.e., the likelihood that an agreed-upon benefit 
promise will not be performed); (ii) expectation uncertainty (i.e., the 
likelihood that a benefit promise does not reflect a mutual understanding 
of promise terms); and (iii) collective uncertainty (i.e., the likelihood that a 
proposed rule will undesirably reduce, overall, the number or generosity of 
future benefit promises). In Part II, we briefly rehearse the most common 
benefit arrangements regulated by ERISA. In Part III, we evaluate how the 
different categories and aspects of ERISA benefit promises implicate 
different mixes of uncertainty. In Part IV, we apply our model to several 
important Supreme Court decisions, explaining, in part, why the Court has 
written opinions that appear indefensible on purely doctrinal grounds. We 
conclude by criticizing both the Court and Congress for failing to candidly 
acknowledge that central questions inadvertently left open by ERISA 
cannot be resolved without a comprehensive legislative response.
16
 
I. UNCERTAINTY IN THE BENEFIT PROMISE 
The phrase ―employee fringe benefit‖ is commonly used to describe 
any nonwage item of value provided by an employer to an employee. Yet 
employer-provided health insurance, pensions, and other perquisites now 
constitute a significant percentage of total compensation for working 
Americans.
17
 Consequently, most scholars refer to these items only as 
―employee benefits.‖ 
Before delivery, an employee benefit is simply a wage substitute 
expressed as a promise of future consideration in whatever form the 
benefit takes (e.g., a monthly pension check, employer-paid health 
insurance premiums). In a well-known ERISA opinion written over twenty 
years ago, Judge Richard A. Posner expressed the point with characteristic 
elegance: ―the less an employee‘s pension rights are worth, the higher are 
 
 
 16. Scholars have long expressed concern that the courts are ill equipped to resolve the various 
policy questions ERISA left unsettled. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 15, at 110 (concluding that courts 
are ―poorly suited‖ to address ERISA‘s gaps and competing policies and that the ―prescription for 
ERISA reform . . . is for Congress to reconsider particular benefits issues and furnish specific answers 
to them‖). Such is even more true today, as we explain. 
 17. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and “Plans,” 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
559, 560 (1994) (explaining that ―[e]mployer-provided benefits are now a major component of 
compensation‖ and noting that ―the cost of all employee benefits constituted 38.4% of payroll in 
1990‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the wages that he will demand.‖18 Although the existence of this wage-
benefit tradeoff is widely accepted by economists,
19
 it was not recognized 
by most American courts until the middle of the twentieth century.
20
 
Any benefit promise will necessarily present ―risks‖ (i.e., undesirable 
outcomes that could materialize).
21
 And any rational decision maker
22
 will 
attempt to quantify such risks before selecting a particular course of 
action.
23
 If a decision maker cannot quantify a material risk, she faces 
 
 
 18. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.‘ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987). Judge 
Posner was speaking of pension benefits, but his reasoning applies to all forms of benefits. And Judge 
Posner was hardly the first to make this point. For a century, economists have characterized employee 
benefits as wage substitutes. See, e.g., Albert deRoode, Pensions as Wages, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 287, 
287 (1913) (―A pension system . . . is really paid by the employee, not perhaps in money, but in the 
foregoing of an increase in wages which he might obtain except for the establishment of a pension 
system.‖). This is not to say, of course, that the benefit-wage trade-off is dollar for dollar. Numerous 
aggregate and individual market factors affect the particular benefit-wage trade-off that will be made 
in given circumstances. Nor do we insist that in all circumstances individual employees necessarily 
can or will perform an accurate wage-benefit trade-off calculation. The operative point we wish to 
highlight is that benefits, even when imperfectly valued or bargained for, are not gratuities.  
 19. See, e.g., Nadia Karamcheva, Evaluating the Wage-Pension Trade-Off in a Dynamic Model 
of Search and Savings 1 (Nov. 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (citing Stephen A. Woodbury, 
Substitution Between Wage and Nonwage Benefits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (1983)), available at 
http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-j/semf2009/Kara.pdf (noting that ―[s]tandard labor theory suggests that 
workers self-select into jobs that offer a mix of wage and non-wage benefits that best matches their 
preferences‖); Karamcheva, supra, at 1 (citing Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of Equalizing Differences, 
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 641 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986)) 
(observing that ―the theory of equalizing differences implies that otherwise identical employees, who 
receive higher non-wage benefits will be paid a lower wage‖). 
 20. See, e.g., Peter M. Rehon, The Pension Expectation as Constitutional Property, 8 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 153, 168 (1980) (―[M]ost courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
viewed noncontributory private pension plans as mere gratuities . . . .‖). See generally A. Norman 
Somers & Louis Schwartz, Pension and Welfare Plans: Gratuities or Compensation?, 4 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 77 (1950); Comment, Consideration for the Employer’s Promise of a Voluntary 
Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1955); Note, Legal Status of Private Industrial Pension Plans, 
53 HARV. L. REV. 1375 (1940). 
 21. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1028 n.1 (1990) (―Technically speaking, ‗risk‘ refers only to the probability of an event, 
with something like ‗gravity‘ designating its possible adverse consequences.‖). 
 22. There is, of course, an extensive behavioral psychology and behavioral economics literature 
questioning the ―rational actor‖ assumption. See Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1651, 1651 (2009) (citing Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1060–66 
(2000)) (―Evidence gathered by psychologists and behavioral economists about human decision 
making over the last three decades has raised a serious challenge to the rational actor assumption of 
neoclassical economics.‖). Concerns about cognitive biases are particularly acute in complex areas like 
retirement and health-care planning. See generally Gary Burtless, An Economic View of Retirement, in 
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 7 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999). We use the 
rational actor assumption as a starting point, not an ending one, in our analysis. 
 23. For example, a rational employee will consider the likelihood that an employer will refuse to 
pay the promised benefit before accepting a particular job offer. See, e.g., Karamcheva, supra note 19, 
at 43–44 (―stud[ying] the trade-off that workers face when choosing between compensation in the 
form of wages versus pension contributions‖ and proposing a model in which ―[t]he decision of a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/3
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what is often referred to by economists as ―uncertainty.‖24 As scholars 
regularly observe, ―[i]gnoring major problems because of uncertainty is an 
invitation to disaster.‖25 In this Part, we present our theory of uncertainty.26 
Part I.A addresses what we refer to as ―performance uncertainty.‖ Part I.B 
addresses what we refer to as ―expectation uncertainty.‖ Part I.C addresses 
what we refer to as ―collective uncertainty.‖27 
A. Performance Uncertainty 
Imagine the following promise made by Promisor A to Promisee B: ―If 
you today relinquish to me your seat on this crowded bus, exactly five 
weeks from today I will pay you five hundred American dollars in cash.‖ 
The danger in relinquishing the seat is not that the promised benefit is 
unclear and that one might be entitled to something less than five hundred 
dollars; the danger is that the promise will not be performed. Among the 
many reasons the promise may not be performed is that the promisor may 
not have five hundred dollars available to give in five weeks‘ time. A 
meeting of the minds does not ensure performance, and in the benefit 
setting—where the beneficiaries are often elderly or ill when the promise 
ripens—performance is paramount.28 
 
 
worker to accept or reject a job offer is the result of an interplay between his preferences and the set of 
incentives and risks associated with the offered pension plan‖). 
 24. The distinction between risk and uncertainty was famously articulated in 1921 by noted 
economist Frank Knight. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) (explaining 
that uncertainty is unquantifiable risk); see also M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, 
UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY 
ANALYSIS (1990). Our use of the term ―uncertainty‖ encompasses both quantifiable and unquantifiable 
risk. 
 25. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty 10 (Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1555343.  
All too often, the response to . . . uncertainty is to ignore the problem in the hope that it will 
go away . . . . Alternatively, advocates seize on their own version of the true magnitude of the 
hazard, as if there were no doubt about the facts. Neither approach produces intelligent 
analysis or sound policy. 
Id. at 2. 
 26. As noted above, we use the term uncertainty to refer to both uncertainty and quantifiable risk. 
For purposes of our conceptual model, the distinction will not matter. Of course, the distinction can 
have great significance in a variety of settings, but such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 27. An employee frequently faces both performance and expectation uncertainty. Generally 
speaking, an employer, because the employee‘s performance precedes benefit delivery, usually faces 
only expectation uncertainty. And the government—i.e., lawmakers and judges—is regularly 
confronted with collective uncertainty.  
 28. See, e.g., RAY BOURHIS, INSULT TO INJURY: INSURANCE, FRAUD, AND THE BIG BUSINESS OF 
BAD FAITH (2005) (explaining one trial lawyer‘s account of the devastating consequences of wrongful 
benefit denials under ERISA). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In the benefit context, performance uncertainty describes the likelihood 
that the promisor will not perform in a way consistent with the shared 
expectations of the parties at promise inception. That is, it describes the 
possibility that the promisor will fail to deliver a benefit when there was, in 
fact, an original meeting of the minds regarding its amount and triggering 
conditions. The most obvious reason for such uncertainty is the possibility 
that the promisor will lack the assets needed to confer the promised benefit 
when the entitlement matures.
29
 
Financial inability, however, is not the only threat to rightful benefit 
conferral. Performance uncertainty also describes the possibility that 
dishonesty, strategic play, or carelessness by the promisor or its agents will 
result in a wrongful refusal to confer a benefit, even where the promisor has 
sufficient assets and there was an original meeting of the minds regarding the 
terms of the benefit promise. In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish 
such an occurrence from what we call ―expectation uncertainty.‖
30
 This 
difficulty can pose challenging problems for policy makers and near-
insurmountable problems for the judiciary.
31
 
 
 
 29. ERISA‘s drafters were acutely conscious of this possibility. Few dispute that the statute was 
passed, in part, as a response to several high-profile pension defaults that arose from company failures 
that devastated the pensions of many workers. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, ―The Most Glorious Story 
of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. 
L. REV. 683, 683–84 (2001) (“When Studebaker-Packard closed the facility in December 1963 the 
pension plan for hourly workers did not have enough assets to meet its obligations. . . . [T]he plan 
defaulted on its obligations to younger employees. Some received a lump-sum payment worth a 
fraction of the pension they expected, and others got nothing at all.‖). 
 30. See infra Part I.B (discussing expectation uncertainty). This difficulty, however, does not 
prevent one from making reasonable assumptions. For example, those who make ERISA benefit 
decisions are often controlled directly or indirectly by the benefit-payor. See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra 
note 15, at 2306. As such, conflicted decision making is common in many ERISA settings where ―the 
promisor keeps one less dollar for every dollar paid in benefits.‖ Id. at 2308; see also id. at 2308 n.36. 
Consider the incentives facing pension administrators for a traditional (i.e., ―defined benefit‖) pension 
plan. See infra Part II.A (describing the mechanics of a defined benefit pension plan). To the extent 
that interpreting an ambiguous promise would reduce the outstanding defined pension obligation by X 
dollars, that is X fewer dollars the company would need to contribute at the next funding interval or 
make up in the event of funding shortfall. Whether the administrators are employees of the employer-
promisor or outside independent contractors, there is likely significant performance uncertainty. See, 
e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 15, at 2309. Of course, employers and their agents face reputational costs 
associated with wrongful benefit denials. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The Assault 
on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 
642 (2001) (―[T]he notion that ERISA-covered plans can deny benefits willy-nilly without significant 
[reputational] penalty is plainly exaggerated.‖). That said, benefit decisions involving complex issues 
or significant discretion may have modest reputational consequences because few, if any, will 
appreciate or even believe the ―wrongness‖ of the denial. See, e.g., Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, 
Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 
398 n.56 (2009) (arguing that ―the extent to which market forces affect the behavior of . . . plan 
fiduciaries is an empirical question . . . [and] there is much evidence to suggest that market forces are 
woefully insufficient‖). 
 31. See infra Part I.C (discussing collective uncertainty). 
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B. Expectation Uncertainty 
Expectation uncertainty describes the likelihood that, at promise 
inception, the parties do not share a material expectation regarding the 
meaning (usually, the applied meaning) of the promise.
32
 The absence of a 
shared expectation can occur because (i) the parties have firm but differing 
initial expectations regarding the meaning of the promise in a particular 
circumstance (a ―circumstance-specific expectation‖), (ii) one party has an 
initial circumstance-specific expectation and the other party does not, or 
(iii) neither party has a circumstance-specific expectation. 
Although the last two variants describe a total or partial absence of a 
specific expectation, they are nonetheless instances of expectation 
uncertainty because, in virtually all cases, a broad standard of conduct 
encompassed by the promise (or imposed by law) supplies a general 
expectation of promise content (e.g., the promisor would follow 
―fiduciary‖ standards of conduct in performing the promise). Missing, 
however, is an expectation regarding the application of that standard in a 
particular circumstance (e.g., that a fiduciary in situation A would do X 
and not Y).
33
 
Indeed, a useful generalization regarding expectation uncertainty tracks 
the time honored rule-standard continuum.
34
 If a one-sentence description 
of law is that it attaches consequences to conduct or circumstance (i.e., if 
Conduct A occurs, Consequence B follows), then, to oversimplify, classic 
―rules‖ are legal directives that, in objectively discernible circumstances, 
impose determinate results.
35
 Classic ―standards‖ are legal directives that, 
 
 
 32. Expectation uncertainty varies significantly with the content and form of the promise. See 
infra Part III. 
 33. We explore this particular example in considerably more detail infra Part III.B–C (discussing 
uncertainties associated with, in particular, 401(k) plan management). 
 34. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–32 (1961); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42–53 (1990); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 14, 22–39 (1967); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different 
Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475, 482–87 (1933); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 
400–18 (1985). Broadly speaking, rules offer the virtue of predictability but the vice of rigidity; 
standards offer the vice of uncertainty but the virtue of situational fairness. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra, at 
561–62 (―One can think of the choice between rules and standards as involving the extent to which a 
given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to an enforcement authority to 
consider.‖). 
 35. ―Rule,‖ obviously, has two meanings. One is a broad meaning, where ―legal rule‖ is 
essentially a synonym for any ―law‖ or ―legal directive.‖ Using that meaning, a ―classic rule‖ and a 
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in circumstances possessing a certain character, authorize a range of 
consequences sensitive to situational facts.
36
 Generally, a benefit promise 
that is contractually or statutorily ―rule-based‖ will contain less 
expectation uncertainty than a ―standard-based‖ promise. The more 
objective and discretely conditioned the promise, the more modest the 
expectation uncertainty.
37
 Conversely, the more discretionary and 
ambiguously conditioned the promise, the higher the expectation 
uncertainty.
38
 
Another useful generalization is that expectation uncertainty varies 
with promise complexity.
39
 Complexity increases the likelihood that a 
promisee will either form incorrect circumstance-specific expectations 
(e.g., she may not appreciate that a specific provision of the promise 
directly speaks to the circumstance), or she may rely, for large portions of 
the promise, on a thematic standard-based expectation (e.g., ―the fiduciary 
must do what is in my best interest‖). 
 
 
―classic standard‖ are both subsets of the universe of rules. The narrow meaning of ―rule‖ is ―rule as 
opposed to a standard.‖ See supra note 34. Because referring to the narrow meaning of rule as ―classic 
rule‖ is cumbersome, throughout this Article we use the term ―rule‖ in both the broad and narrow 
ways, with the relevant meaning supplied by context. 
 36. Of course, a directive may have both qualities.  
For example, a rule may determine which of two standards applies, or vice versa (as when 
two rules arguably govern and some principle must be invoked to choose between the rules). 
Even focusing on a single step in reaching a legal conclusion, a particular law will have 
qualities of rules and of standards, with competing formulations differing in the degree to 
which they are rule- or standard-like. 
Kaplow, supra note 34, at 561 n.6. Moreover, application of a standard to a common fact pattern can 
result in a de facto rule, where all similar fact patterns are treated formalistically. See, e.g., RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.1, at 583 (7th ed. 2007) (―[A]n accumulation of 
precedents dealing with the same question may create a rule of law having the same force as an 
explicit statutory rule.‖); see also Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1989) (discussing precedents as rules). Imprecision, however, does not diminish the heuristic value of 
the rules-standards generalization. 
 37. For example, a simple pension promise of a fixed monthly payment, payable at age 65 and 
based exclusively on years worked, with no offset or adjustments for salary, poses relatively little 
expectation uncertainty. Cf. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: 
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (1988) (―[A]t the margin there can be doubt 
about how particular [defined benefit pension] plan terms apply to particular circumstances.‖) 
(emphasis added). 
 38. Health insurance, using ―medical necessity‖ as the coverage fulcrum, is a well-known, 
perhaps notorious, example. See infra Part III.C. 
 39. By complexity, we speak expansively. We refer to the number of operative parts of the 
promise (e.g., a pension promise with two conditions is easier to understand than one with twenty). We 
also refer to the extent to which nonexperts can understand a material element of the promise in a 
circumstance-specific way. 
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C. Collective Uncertainty 
Broadly speaking, performance and expectation uncertainty impair the 
smooth functioning of the labor market.
40
 In many cases, the result of such 
impairment is financially
41
 or physically devastating.
42
 Therefore, 
government intervention is often proposed. Experts have long recognized, 
however, that such measures are not free of consequences.
43
 Put simply, 
ensuring performance and protecting promisee expectations may increase 
substantially the cost to the promisor.
44
 That, in turn, could result in fewer 
 
 
 40. As noted above, benefits are compensation—not gifts. See supra notes 18–20 and 
accompanying text. A hypothetically rational employer (or employee) cannot offer (or accept) a 
compensation package without first understanding the expected value of both the promised benefits 
and the foregone wages. Performance and expectation uncertainty make it considerably more difficult 
to make the correct wage-benefit trade-off. An expectation risk example: an employee who voluntarily 
foregoes wages in exchange for health insurance would—all else being equal—have traded more 
wages than is rational if she believed the promised health insurance benefits were considerably more 
generous than an average impartial arbiter would have concluded. A performance risk example: an 
employee who voluntarily foregoes wages in exchange for a traditional pension would—all else being 
equal—have traded more wages than is rational if she understood the nominal value of the promised 
pension but failed entirely to consider a meaningful likelihood that the company will go bankrupt and 
have insufficient assets to pay its pensioners. Of course, even when players are not perfectly rational, 
performance and expectation uncertainty would still impair bargaining.  
 41. See, e.g., Phelps v. C.T. Enters., Inc., 394 F.3d 213, 220 (4th Cir. 2005) (allegedly wrongful 
termination of health plan funding left employees with $286,000 in unpaid claims); Drennan v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1992) (GM allegedly told laid-off employees that they were 
not eligible for a particular plan in order to induce them to choose a substantially less generous plan). 
 42. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 1998) (death 
allegedly caused by delayed authorization for bone marrow transplant); Cannon v. Grp. Health Serv. of 
Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1271 (10th Cir. 1996) (death allegedly caused by delayed authorization for 
treatment); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1995) (suicide allegedly resulting 
from refusal to authorize psychiatric benefits under the plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 
129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993) (death allegedly caused by withdrawn authorization for surgery); Kuhl v. 
Lincoln Nat‘l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993) (death allegedly resulting from 
delayed authorization for surgery); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 
1992) (death of unborn child allegedly caused by denial of authorization for hospitalization); Turner v. 
Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, 953 F. Supp. 419, 421 (D. Mass. 1997), aff’d, 127 F.3d 196, 197 (1st Cir. 
1997) (death allegedly resulting from the denial of a bone marrow transplant). 
 43. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 228 
[hereinafter Langbein, Supreme Court Flunks Trusts] (―[T]he price of [stronger protective legal rules] 
will be lowered levels of plan formation and less generous funding.‖); Stein, supra note 15, at 73 
(―[T]he overarching policy decision to furnish retirement and health benefits through the private 
employment market rests uneasily on competing notions: government regulation is necessary to ensure 
that private law adequately delivers benefits, but too much regulation diminishes the willingness of 
employers to sponsor plans at all.‖). 
 44. See, e.g., Carole Roan Gresenz et al., A Flood of Litigation? Predicting the Consequences of 
Changing Legal Remedies Available to ERISA Beneficiaries, RAND HEALTH LAW 2 tbl.1 (1999), 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP184.pdf (column entitled ―opponents of 
changing remedies‖). 
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employers making promises
45
 or employers making less generous 
promises.
46
 
ERISA is commonly read to reflect a legislative desire for more (and 
more generous) plans. Not only does such sentiment appear, in the view of 
some, in the legislative history, but it also sounds in favor of the tax 
subsidy.
47
 ERISA‘s drafters, one could argue, made the proper normative 
judgment (i.e., that it is socially desirable to encourage additional 
retirement savings and greater welfare—such as health—insurance 
coverage). Accordingly, some observers presumptively view 
governmental measures that could diminish the overall frequency or 
generosity of benefits to constitute a decrease in the welfare of promisees 
as a group—and perhaps the nation as a whole. 
―Collective uncertainty‖ is our term for the possibility that, for an 
imagined rule affecting the benefit promise, the costs associated with 
compliance and enforcement will be such that the rule on balance may or 
will actually decrease overall welfare.
48
 To the extent that they are made 
explicit, concerns about collective uncertainty are often formulated as 
follows: if Judicial Rule A or Regulation B or Statutory Amendment C is 
put in place, the undesirable consequence will be fewer or less generous 
plans. That is, collective uncertainty admits of the possibility that making 
benefit promises more secure will not be ―worth‖ it because it may lead to 
 
 
 45. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the Scope of the Settlor 
Doctrine, 15 LAB. LAW. 205, 213 (1999) (―An inherent tension exists in ERISA between, on the one 
hand, protecting the benefit expectations of plan participants and, on the other hand, limiting the costs 
imposed upon benefit plan sponsors so as not to overly discourage voluntary plan sponsorship.‖).  
 46. Cf. SHARON TENNYSON & WILLIAM J. WARFEL, NAT‘L ASS‘N MUT. INS. COS., FIRST-PARTY 
INSURANCE BAD FAITH LIABILITY: LAW, THEORY, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 14 (2008), 
available at http://www.namic.org/publicpolicy/080926BadFaith.pdf (arguing that the careless 
expansion of liability ―will [result in] unwarranted increases in claim costs that are ultimately 
distributed to the insuring public in the form of higher insurance premiums‖).  
 47. See infra Part II.A (discussing subsidy). A keen observer might argue that the legislative 
history can more accurately be portrayed as expressing congressional concern only that there not be 
appreciably fewer or less generous plans, as opposed to a desire to affirmatively encourage plan 
formation or more generous benefits. The merits of this distinction aside, the Supreme Court does not 
appear to accept it. See, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648–49 (2010) (quoting Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004)) (―We have therefore recognized that ERISA 
represents a ‗careful balancing between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan 
and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.‘‖). 
 48. Any government action presents the possibility of decreasing overall social welfare. See, e.g., 
Gillette & Krier, supra note 21, at 1028 (―[T]hough risk by definition is costly, avoiding risk is costly 
as well.‖). Some regulatory costs are direct (e.g., the salaries of government employees). Others result 
from incentives created by the government intervention. See, e.g., Stris, supra note 30, at 396–99 
(discussing, at some length, typical incentive arguments made by each side of the debate over the 
proper liability rules for wrongful denial of ERISA benefits); see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 21, 
at 1028 (noting that ―the objective of risk management must be . . . the minimization of all risk-related 
costs‖). 
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a possible reduction in collective welfare. In other words, a few broken 
promises or defeated expectations may be acceptable if the result is more 
plans and more generous benefit promises overall.
49
 
A decrease in collective welfare associated with benefit promise rule 
choice is not abstract fantasy. Consider the following hypothetical 
proposal: Congress, to increase the deterrent power of ERISA remedies, 
amends the statute to require that all wrongful health-care benefit denials 
result in the imposition of punitive damages equal to five times the value 
of the denied benefit. There is little doubt that such an amendment would 
cause many employers to cease offering health insurance as an employee 
benefit. Given the lack of reasonable individual (nongroup) health 
insurance options in America,
50
 such a result would be undesirable in the 
eyes of many observers.
51
 
II. THE ERISA BENEFIT PROMISE 
In this Part, we rehearse the most common benefit promises that are 
regulated by ERISA. Part II.A explores the traditional pension promise. 
Part II.B evaluates the now-dominant pension promise of which the 401(k) 
is the most common example. Part II.C briefly addresses typical welfare 
benefit promises (e.g., health, disability, and life insurance). 
A. The Defined Benefit Pension Promise 
ERISA governs two kinds of employee benefit plans:
52
 One—a pension 
plan—is defined by the statute as ―any plan, fund, or program . . . 
established or maintained by an employer‖ that ―provides retirement 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the 
Benefit Promise, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 657, 665–69 (discussing possible consequences of more protective 
rules). As we discuss later, certain promise types (and subsets of promise types), as well as attendant 
legal rules, can be more ―volatile‖ and uncertain than others. This may deter risk-averse employers 
from making the promise in the first place or result in risk-averse employers promising less. See infra 
Part III.A and accompanying notes. 
 50. See generally Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients As Consumers: Courts, Contracts, 
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008); Mark A. Hall, Of Magic Wands 
and Kaleidoscopes: Fixing Problems in the Individual Market, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 23, 2002, available 
at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.353v1. 
 51. Recent health-care reform—depending on the degree to which it survives the parade of legal 
challenges—may, of course, make desirable and affordable individual health insurance more readily 
available. We merely use a hypothetical health-care legal rule to illustrate the concept of collective 
uncertainty in a given benefit regime. 
 52. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006) (―The term ‗employee benefit plan‘ or ‗plan‘ means an employee 
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare 
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.‖). 
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income‖ or ―results in a deferral of income by employees . . . .‖53 The 
statute expressly divides all pension plans into two further categories: 
―defined benefit‖ and ―defined contribution.‖54 
A defined benefit plan is intended ―to provide systematically for the 
payment of definitely determinable benefits to . . . employees over a 
period of years, usually for life, after retirement.‖55 The amount of the 
benefit is calculated pursuant to a formula that customarily takes into 
account the participant‘s years of service and compensation.56 When 
ERISA was enacted in 1974, the vast majority of retirement plan 
participants were covered by a defined benefit plan.
57
 
No employer is required to sponsor a defined benefit (or any other) 
pension plan. In order to encourage sponsorship, however, the federal 
government has long awarded preferential tax treatment to such plans.
58
 
Broadly speaking, the mechanics of this preference can be summarized as 
follows: ―employer contributions to the plans are deductible expenses . . . 
at the time the contributions are made . . . and neither the contributions nor 
the investment earnings . . . are taxable until benefits are actually paid to 
the plan participants.‖59 
The basic thinking is as follows: many employees will likely be 
indifferent (at best) as between $X in current salary and a guaranteed 
future income stream whose net present value is $X. If the latter is subject 
to more favorable tax treatment, however, a greater number of employees 
may choose to forego pretax wages in exchange for it. Accordingly, the 
government has elected to afford more favorable tax treatment to pensions 
in order to encourage employees to defer compensation so that they will 
have a steady stream of income once they reach the age of retirement. This 
 
 
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (defined contribution); § 1002(35) (defined benefit). 
 55. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2004). 
 56. See DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 201–12 (7th ed. 1996); 
see also Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined 
Contribution Plans, 1999 LAW REV. MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C. L. 187, 187 (citing Ann C. Foster, 
Public and Private Sector Defined Benefit Pensions: A Comparison, 2 COMPENSATION & WORKING 
CONDITIONS 37 (1997)) (―For example, a [defined benefit pension] plan might provide that a worker‘s 
annual retirement benefit is equal to 2% times years of service times final average compensation (B = 
2% x yos x fac).‖).  
 57. WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY, supra note 15, at 278 (―As late as 1979, more than 80 percent of 
individuals who participated in a private retirement plan were in a defined-benefit plan.‖); Fishel & 
Langbein, supra note 37, at 1112. There were employees covered by what today we would call defined 
contribution plans, but the assets in those plans were vastly smaller than the assets backing the defined 
benefit plans. 
 58. See PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES, at vii (William G. Gale, John B. Shoven, & 
Mark J. Warshawsky eds., 2004) (―Tax incentives for employer-based pensions originated in 1921.‖). 
 59. MCGILL, supra note 56, at 136; see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 402–404 (2006). 
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was a major social policy decision.
60
 It results in the loss of almost fifty 
billion dollars in tax revenue each year.
61
 And it is an enduring 
justification for the extensive restrictions that are placed on private-sector 
pension plans.
62
 
It is worth noting that defined benefit plans were used prior to the level 
of tax preference that exists today.
63
 This illustrates that there are nontax 
reasons to sponsor such plans. For example, a defined benefit plan can be 
used to create incentives that influence significantly the timing of 
employees‘ retirement decisions,64 to create incentives that discourage 
quitting by employees in whom the employer has made a substantial 
investment,
65
 and to improve job performance by giving employees a 
direct financial stake in the viability of the firm.
66
 
 
 
 60. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2002) (―The passage of [ERISA] marked the federal government‘s recognition 
that promoting retirement security through employer-sponsored pension plans was an important 
national goal.‖). 
 61. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 298 tbl.19-3 (noting that the tax 
expenditure for ―employer plans‖ was more than $45 billion in 2009). The foregone revenues 
associated with other employer-sponsored pensions (e.g., 401(k) and Keogh plans) are listed 
separately. See id. 
 62. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006) (listing various requirements that a plan must satisfy in 
order to ―qualify‖ for preferential tax treatment). 
 63. ―By 1933, private [defined benefit] pensions covered roughly one in six workers in the 
economy.‖ RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE, 
ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 3 (1997) [hereinafter IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE]. 
 64. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Yung-Ping Chen, Optimal Retirement Age, in 2 NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION § 14.03(2) (2008) (noting 
that a defined benefit plan will customarily ―impose large financial penalties on workers who stay past 
the plan‘s normal retirement age‖ and ―often offer early retirement incentives‖); see also IPPOLITO, 
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 12 (―Virtually all firms penalize late retirement through 
the [defined benefit] pension plan‖ by ―refraining from awarding offsetting increases in annuities to 
workers who choose to retire beyond the normal retirement age.‖); Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the 
Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 31 J.L. & Econ. 85, 87 (1988) 
[hereinafter Ippolito, ERISA Study] (asserting that defined benefit plans ―permit the firm to penalize 
workers who . . . retire ‗too late‘‖); Andrew A. Samwick, New Evidence on Pensions, Social Security, 
and the Timing of Retirement, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 207 (1998); James H. Stock & David A. Wise, 
Pensions, the Option Value of Work, and Retirement, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1151 (1990). See generally 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David A. Wise, The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans, in ISSUES IN 
PENSION ECONOMICS 283 (1987).  
 65. See, e.g., Forman & Chen, supra note 64, § 14.03(2) (noting that a defined benefit plan will 
typically ―provide large financial incentives for workers to stay with a firm at least until they are 
eligible for early retirement‖); see also IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 3 
(noting ―the traditional view that [defined benefit] pensions help employers reduce quit rates at early 
ages‖); id. at 17 (arguing that ―[d]eparture from the firm . . . ‗too early‘ . . . breaks the contract and 
triggers pensions penalties‖); id. at 18–29 (evaluating the impact of defined benefit pensions on quit 
rates); ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÚN, COMING UP SHORT, THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) 
PLANS 2 (2004) (―Since pension benefits based on final earnings increase rapidly as job tenures 
lengthen, these plans motivate workers to remain with the firm.‖); Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 
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B. The Defined Contribution Pension Promise 
Unlike a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan does not 
promise a specific amount of benefits at retirement. Instead, an employee 
who participates in a defined contribution plan is assigned an individual 
account within the plan to which money is contributed by the employee, 
her employer, or both.
67
 The employee is a beneficial owner of the funds 
allocated to her individual account.
68
 At any point in time, her account 
balance is equal to the total amount of past contributions, adjusted to 
reflect the account‘s share of any income or expenses, any gains or losses, 
and any forfeitures of other participants‘ accounts.69 Upon retirement, the 
employee‘s benefit is simply the balance of her account.70 In essence, a 
defined contribution pension plan is a ―tax-preferred savings account[].‖71 
As noted above, in terms of assets and number of participants, defined 
benefit plans were the dominant variety of retirement arrangements when 
ERISA was enacted in 1974.
72
 The pension landscape, however, has 
dramatically changed since that time.
73
 In fact, scholars generally agree 
that the most important development in private pensions over the past two 
decades is the massive shift away from defined benefit to defined 
 
 
64, at 87 (asserting that defined benefit plans ―permit the firm to penalize workers who . . . quit the 
firm ‗too early‘‖). 
 66. IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 4 (noting the settled view that 
―defined benefit plans . . . dissuade workers from shirking or engaging in malfeasance on the job‖); 
Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 (noting that defined benefit plans ―expose the work force 
as a whole to losses in the event of firm failure, thereby giving workers a stake in the long-term 
viability of the firm‖). Employees with certain preferences are willing to accept such a deal (i.e., to 
join an employer with a defined benefit plan thereby foregoing wages) because such employment 
―provid[es] an opportunity . . . to spread investment risks over a large number of cohorts,‖ Ippolito, 
ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 88, by ―tak[ing] advantage of the long horizon of firms relative to 
workers . . . .‖ Id. at 87–88. 
 67. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
 68. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 69. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 70. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 56, at 188 n.3 (―[C]ontributions might be set at 10% of annual 
compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30,000 in a given year would have $3,000 
contributed to an individual investment account for her. Her benefit at retirement would be based on 
all such contributions plus investment earnings thereon.‖). 
 71. Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 (also explaining that, in such a plan, ―[t]he firm 
deposits a portion of wages into each worker‘s account each year and, after short vesting periods . . . , 
the account belongs to the workers‖). 
 72. Even as recently as 1988, ―[a]pproximately four out of five pension participants [we]re 
covered primarily by defined benefit pension plans.‖ Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 
(emphasis omitted). 
 73. Forman, supra note 56, at 189 (―In the private sector, the shift away from defined benefit 
plans has been going on for years.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] ERISA & UNCERTAINTY 449 
 
 
 
 
contribution plans.
74
 In the United States, this is largely attributable to the 
explosive growth of the 401(k) plan—named after a provision in the 
Internal Revenue Code that did not exist when ERISA was signed into 
law.
75
 
Several theories have been advanced to explain this shift to defined 
contribution plans. Some focus on changes in federal regulatory policy 
that increased the relative cost of administering defined benefit plans.
76
 
Others focus on what they argue is disproportionately favorable tax 
treatment of the 401(k).
77
 Still others maintain that something more 
fundamental occurred—a change in the way Americans think about 
savings.
78
 Regardless of the reason, this shift has led to much debate about 
what, if any, changes in government policy should be implemented in 
response.
79
 
C. The Welfare Benefit Promise 
As previously noted, ERISA was not limited to the regulation of 
pension plans; it also governs what the statute refers to as ―welfare‖ 
plans.
80
 A welfare plan is defined as ―any plan, fund, or program . . . 
 
 
 74. IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 4 (―The most important development 
in private pensions in the past fifteen years is the gradual shift away from defined benefit plans and 
toward defined contribution plans.‖). 
 75. See, e.g., WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY, supra note 15, at 279. To be sure, however, ―there has 
been a worldwide trend towards defined contribution plans that seems to be affecting both private 
pensions and national social security programs.‖ Forman, supra note 56, at 189–90 (footnote omitted) 
(citing WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND 
PROMOTE GROWTH (1994); Kevin Dent & David Sloss, The Global Outlook for Defined Contribution 
Versus Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 12 BENEFITS Q. 23 (1996); Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose 
Pension Is It Anyway? Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 1653, 1660–64 (1998)). 
 76. See MCGILL, supra note 56, at 40 (―While the possible explanations for the decline in 
defined benefit plans and the shift toward defined contribution plans are numerous, at least part of the 
reason is the increasing expense of administering defined benefit plans.‖).  
 77. IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 7 (―Congress enacted legislation that 
increased the relative costs of defined benefit plans, in terms of both higher regulatory burden and 
smaller tax advantages.‖). 
 78. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 
(2004). 
 79. ―[T]here is a good deal of debate about how and whether government policies should be 
changed to stem the ‗erosion‘ in traditional defined benefit plans.‖ Forman, supra note 56, at 190 
(citing ADVISORY COUNCIL OF EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFITS, U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR, REPORT 
ON THE WORKING GROUP ON THE MERITS OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION VS. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
WITH AN EMPHASIS ON SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS (1997); Sue Burzawa, Defined Benefit vs. 
Defined Contribution Plans—Current State of the Debate and Future Influences, 51 EMP. BENEFIT 
PLAN REV. 10 (1997); Christopher Conte, Retirement Prospects in a Defined Contribution World: A 
Report on EBRI’s April 30, 1997, Policy Forum, 18 EBRI NOTES 1 (1997)). 
 80. See supra note 3. 
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established or maintained by an employer‖ that ―provid[es] . . . medical, 
surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, 
accident, disability, death or unemployment . . . .‖81 Today, many welfare 
plan benefits take the form of insurance (whether through self-insurance or 
a third-party policy the employer purchases).
82
 Pursuant to such an 
arrangement, an employee gives up some amount of current wages in 
exchange for a promise of a contractually defined benefit payment if and 
when a contingent event should occur.
83
 
As of 2002, ERISA-governed welfare plans covered 137 million 
workers, retirees, and their families.
84
 These plans have an extraordinary 
influence on the delivery of health-care
85
 and other nonretirement benefits 
such as severance pay, life insurance, and disability insurance.
86
 This 
astonishing growth in welfare benefits—most notably employer-sponsored 
health insurance—was almost certainly not anticipated by those who 
drafted the statute.
87
 
 
 
 81. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).  
 82. See infra note 85. 
 83. There are several perils that are often covered by employer-sponsored insurance: illness 
(health insurance), debilitating injuries (disability insurance), death (life insurance), and income 
disruption (severance pay). 
 84. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Qualchoice‘s Petition for 
En Banc Rehearing at 13, Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-3614). 
 85. The majority of private health insurance in the United States is provided through ERISA-
governed welfare plans. See Sara R. Collins, Chapin White & Jennifer L. Kriss, Whither Employer-
Based Health Insurance? The Current and Future Role of U.S. Companies in the Provision and 
Financing of Health Insurance, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Sept. 2007, at 7 fig.1, available at 
http://www. commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2007/Sep/Whither-Employer-
Based-Health-Insurance--The-Current-and-Future-Role-of-U-S--Companies-in-the-Provis.aspx (noting 
that, in 2006, 62% of nonelderly Americans received private health insurance from an employer); see 
also GARY OLIN, MEDICAL EXPENDITURES OF THE NON-ELDERLY BY AGE AND INSURANCE STATUS, 
2004, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st197/ 
stat197.pdf (noting that 79% of all medical expenditures were made by those with private health 
insurance in 2004).  
 86. For example, ―[s]hort- and long-term disability benefits were available [in 2004] to 39 and 30 
percent of workers, respectively, and nearly all participated.‖ U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ 
ebsm0002.pdf. 
 87. See, e.g., WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY, supra note 15, at 281 (―In the political history of 
pension reform, there was little discussion of employer-sponsored health plans.‖); Catherine L. Fisk, 
Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee 
Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 165 (1995) (ERISA‘s drafters gave ―relatively little thought to the 
problem of health benefits . . . .‖); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based 
Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 23, 29 (2001) (―Health benefits were 
included in ERISA as an afterthought, with little consideration given to whether the same regulatory 
framework would work . . . .‖). 
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III. UNCERTAINTY IN THE ERISA BENEFIT PROMISE 
ERISA‘s passage was premised on a simple trade-off. Congress wished 
to make benefit promises more secure, but not so costly as to result in 
appreciably fewer or less generous benefit promises being made overall. 
Legal rules can significantly affect both promise security and cost. 
Consequently, the question of what rules to impose is one of central 
importance. As explained in Part I, the answer must turn on the 
performance, expectation, and collective uncertainties that attend the 
benefit promise at issue.
88
 In this Part, we evaluate the nuanced ways in 
which these uncertainties differ both across and within the primary benefit 
arrangements governed by ERISA. 
A. Defined Benefit Pension Promise Uncertainty 
The overwhelming focus of ERISA was the defined benefit pension 
plan.
89
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, examination of the statute reveals that 
Congress gave thoughtful consideration to the promise-security versus 
promise-cost trade-off in selecting legal rules to govern this category of 
employee benefits. 
Performance Uncertainty. A major threat to the traditional pension was 
one specific manifestation of performance uncertainty—promises broken 
for lack of funds.
90
 ERISA included potent safeguards to minimize this 
type of uncertainty. Congress established mandatory funding rules,
91
 
required that plan assets be held in trust,
92
 imposed specific obligations 
and prohibitions on those who administered the trust,
93
 and collected 
premium payments from plan sponsors to fund a government-run pension 
insurance program.
94
 Although one could argue that these safeguards are 
 
 
 88. For example, promises—or identifiable aspects of promises—that pose massive performance 
uncertainty but little collective uncertainty likely deserve different legal rules than promises with a 
converse balance of uncertainty. The simple reason is that rules that potently address uncertainty of a 
certain type and magnitude may do little to address (and often worsen) uncertainty of a different type 
and size. The uncertainty to be tamed drives rule selection. 
 89. Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 (―Defined benefit pension plans are the primary 
focus of ERISA . . . .‖). 
 90. See supra note 29. 
 91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1086 (2006). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006) (―[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust 
by one or more trustees‖ who, subject to limited exceptions, ―shall have exclusive authority and 
discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan . . . .‖). 
 93. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006); see also infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). According to ERISA, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) was created:  
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too ―costly,‖95 observers seem to agree that ERISA has been successful in 
this area.
96
 
Expectation Uncertainty. The obvious (though often ignored) point of 
any defined employee benefit is to define the benefit (i.e., to limit by 
contract and statutory command the likelihood that the parties will have 
differing understandings regarding the content of the promise). This, 
indeed, is the appeal of a defined benefit; all parties involved know its 
value. As such, they are better able to bargain over wages and benefits, 
and to plan accordingly for retirement. A central aim of a defined benefit 
arrangement, then, is to reduce expectation uncertainty.
97
 Of course, 
successful mitigation of such uncertainty will also lessen performance 
uncertainty because clearer promises are more difficult to break with 
impunity (i.e., there are reputational consequences and a greater likelihood 
of ex post legal sanction).
98
 
In order to improve the definition of all employee benefits, ERISA 
imposed several general requirements. It required that plans be in writing
99
 
and ―specify the basis on which payments are made . . . from the plan.‖100 
For similar reasons, it imposed disclosure and reporting requirements.
101
 
 
 
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the 
benefit of their participants, (2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of 
pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under plans to which this subchapter 
applies, and (3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 1306 of 
this title at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this subchapter. 
Id. 
 95. The argument would be that strict funding requirements—and the cost of regulatory 
compliance—discourage the offering of pensions, including some pensions that would have in fact 
been performed (i.e., the reduced performance uncertainty of strict funding requirements is outweighed 
by increased collective uncertainty).  
 96. This is not to say there are not grounds for criticism regarding the PBGC insurance program. 
Appropriate premium levels and funding rules have been and are subject to considerable debate. See, 
e.g., Daniel B. Klaff, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: Reforming the Defined Benefit Pension 
System, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553, 559–60 (2007) (mentioning recent legislative debate over funding 
and premiums). 
 97. Certainly defined benefits also transfer retirement income risk from the promisee to the 
promisor, although that self-evidently depends on the financial robustness of the promisor and the 
scope of any government guarantee. In contrast, far too infrequently acknowledged is the real work 
that defining the benefit accomplishes. Clarity supplies utility whether the promise is soundly or 
weakly backed. 
 98. Cf. infra note 108. 
 99. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2006). 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4); see also MCGILL, supra note 56, at 46 (―This requirement‘s 
fundamental purpose is to ensure that the plan is a formal arrangement, communicated as such to all 
employees affected, and that it is distinguishable from the informal and unenforceable arrangements 
that characterized the early years of the private pension movement in this country.‖).  
 101. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006) (requiring a summary plan description ―written in a 
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant‖); S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 11 (1973) 
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With regard to defined benefit pension plans, ERISA went even further. It 
imposed certain mandatory contract terms regarding vesting.
102
 It also 
included specific requirements regarding the form of written promises.
103
 
The corresponding reduction in expectation uncertainty is self-evident. We 
consider next the more difficult question: to what extent does enforcement 
of such rules heighten collective uncertainty? 
Collective Uncertainty. In regulating the traditional pension promise, 
Congress was careful to avoid broadly mandating specific promise content 
(i.e., a pension benefit must be at least X% of an employee‘s highest 
annual salary). Congress also made numerous decisions in drafting ERISA 
that were designed to minimize the costs of regulatory compliance.
104
 
Congress was evidently concerned about the collective uncertainty that 
might arise from rules which could substantially increase promise cost. 
Concerns about the chilling effects of high promise cost did not, 
however, lead Congress to abandon traditional civil enforcement rules.
105
 
This is not surprising because there is little reason to believe that judicial 
application of traditional liability rules would imperil the frequency or 
generosity of defined benefit pension promises any more than default 
contract rules in general limit deal content and frequency.
106
 To be fair, 
defined benefit promises have grown considerably more complicated in 
the years following ERISA‘s enactment. But increased complexity does 
 
 
(―Subcommittee findings were abundant in establishing that an average plan participant, even where 
he has been furnished an explanation of his plan provisions, often cannot comprehend them because of 
the technicalities and complexities of the language used.‖); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (2006) 
(providing remedies for violations of disclosure and reporting requirements). 
 102. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2006). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 
2085, amended ERISA and shortened the vesting periods. See also Langbein, supra note 43, at 227 
(footnote omitted) (―ERISA abridges freedom of contract in some respects, but not others. For 
example, ERISA‘s vesting rules greatly restrict the parties‘ freedom to agree upon forfeiture of 
accrued pension benefits, yet ERISA‘s vesting rules do not apply to nonpension benefits such as health 
care.‖). 
 103. Defined benefit pension plans are required to provide benefits that are computed via a fixed 
formula and not within the discretion of the promisor. See Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130 
(confirming that benefits are definitely determinable when computed via a fixed formula and ―not 
within the discretion of the employer‖); 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2009) (requiring that a plan 
provide ―definitely determinable benefits‖); see also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(25) (2006) (pertaining to 
―actuarial assumptions‖). 
 104. One such example was the inclusion of broad preemption provisions. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a) (2006). Preemption, among other things, shields promisors that conduct multistate business 
from having to comply with the regulatory requirements of several jurisdictions, which can pose 
significant cost. 
 105. Congress specifically authorized a private right of action permitting a participant or 
beneficiary in any ERISA plan to bring suit to, inter alia, ―enforce his rights under the terms of the 
plan.‖ 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006); see also infra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 106. For reasons we explore below, however, ERISA has been interpreted by the Supreme Court 
such that ―consequential damages are not allowed.‖ Epstein & Sykes, supra note 30, at 632. 
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not warrant restriction or abandonment of the protective rules included in 
ERISA addressing the traditional pension promise. If anything, it militates 
in favor of increased protection.  
This is so for two reasons. First, promise complexity significantly 
increases expectation uncertainty on the part of employees, which 
frustrates meaningful bargaining and planning.
107
 Second, promise 
complexity significantly increases performance uncertainty because it 
provides greater opportunity for opportunistic behavior by the promisor.
108
 
In our view, these uncertainty perils faced by an employee who has been 
promised a complicated pension are not counterbalanced by significant 
collective uncertainty associated with traditional liability rules. It is 
important to understand why. 
Few, if any, benefit promises offer interpretative certainty. After all, 
benefit promises convey an entitlement triggered upon obtaining a certain 
state of the world, and entitlements contingent upon world states will 
contain some degree of ambiguity as to the content of the entitlement or 
the existence of the triggering world state. There will always be some 
possibility—whether small or large—that two impartial arbiters will 
conclude that the meaning of a benefit promise is slightly different. So let 
us say that for a given benefit promise, the more likely it is that impartial 
arbiters will disagree about the meaning of a benefit promise, the more 
―volatile‖ the promise is. Comparatively high volatility can pose collective 
uncertainty problems because risk-averse promisors will be less likely to 
make high-volatility promises or will offer less generous promises (in 
effect, charging the average promisee an ―interpretative volatility 
premium‖).109 
Comparatively speaking, however, defined benefit pension promises 
are not volatile; after all, they are necessarily formulas memorialized in 
contract.
110
 Indeed, to the extent a pension promise is so complicated that 
 
 
 107. Employees face well-recognized cognitive and transaction cost limitations. See, e.g., supra 
note 22. Thus, the more complex the defined benefit promise, the more likely the employee will be 
unaware of its terms.  
 108. Failure to honor a complex promise may never be detected (i.e., some beneficiaries may not 
ultimately realize that the promisor is interpreting the promise in a less generous manner than 
originally intended). Failure to honor a complex promise is also less likely to result in reputational 
costs (i.e., violating the clear terms of a simple pension is considerably more likely to damage a 
promisor‘s reputation). And failure to honor a complex promise is less likely to result in ex post legal 
sanction because it may be difficult, in practice, to establish that the promise was broken. 
 109. In other words, a benefit promise change, occasioned by a new legal rule or otherwise, that is 
expected to be X% more costly will be avoided by promisors who have no tolerance for high variance 
around an expected X% increase. Alternatively, such promisors could severely reduce the generosity of 
the promise as a hedge against cost variance. 
 110. In our view, the same cannot be said for non-formula-based defined benefits such as health 
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it is susceptible to more than a modest range of interpretations, it bears 
little resemblance to the ―defined‖ promise ERISA intended to 
subsidize.
111
 In our view, it is odd to choose legal rules prioritizing the 
minimization of collective uncertainty, which is the direct result of the 
underlying promise having fundamentally strayed from the central 
attributes the statute intended to encourage. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, promisors are well positioned to 
deal with volatility privately (i.e., by making less complicated 
promises).
112
 After all, ERISA explicitly requires that traditional pension 
benefits are defined and disclosed in a manner comprehensible to the 
―average plan participant.‖113 To us, this indicates a preference for rules 
that are more likely to render promises simple and intelligible. It hardly 
seems faithful to congressional intent, therefore, to favor rules that permit 
complicated promises at the cost of heightened performance and 
expectation uncertainty. 
Two Wrinkles. Although far less common, defined benefit pension 
disputes can arise over matters other than promise content. One important 
category presents acute expectation and collective uncertainties (i.e., 
disputes over the right of a promisor to change the terms of the promise). 
The importance of rule selection and interpretation in this context is 
difficult to overstate: an unfettered right to modify promise content 
essentially makes a pension promise illusory (and thus often ―broken‖); 
the lack of a right to modify content makes a promise permanent (and thus 
rarely made). The mix of uncertainties implicated by this issue is both 
complex and unique; thorough examination is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
114
 
 
 
insurance. See infra Part III.C (exploring, at length, the nature and consequences of the health 
insurance benefit).  
 111. See supra note 103 (discussing numerous ERISA provisions requiring specificity in the 
defined benefit pension promise). 
 112. Perhaps the downside is that simpler promises do not accurately reflect the nuanced 
preferences of the players. But that is a policy judgment. Imagine the following: Under Regime A, 
pension promises are subject to traditional or employee-favoring legal rules. In such a regime, one 
would expect simple and generic defined benefit pensions that closely resemble (or in fact are) 
standard annuities bought and sold on the open market, with little expectation uncertainty and few 
disputes. Under Regime B, pension promises are subject to promisor-favoring legal rules (e.g., damage 
limitations, standards of review deferential to the promisor, and mandatory administrative review prior 
to commencement of suit). One would expect complicated pensions that might better reflect the 
specific preferences of many employees but which would also pose heightened expectation risk. 
Which regime is ―better‖ depends on empirics and normative judgments.  
 113. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006); see also supra note 101 (discussing § 1022(a)).  
 114. For an excellent treatment of the economic arguments underlying the debate over this issue, 
see James A. Wooten, Who Should Own a Pension Surplus—Employer or Employees? An 
Assessment of Arguments about Asymmetry of Risks and Rewards and Deferred Wages in Pension 
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A second major category implicates what are commonly referred to as 
fiduciary duties and statuses. Fiduciary matters, and their attendant 
uncertainty, can arise in any benefit arrangement; however, they pervade 
the defined contribution pension promise. As such, we address them in our 
discussion below.
115
 
B. Defined Contribution Pension Promise Uncertainty 
From its inception, ERISA has regulated defined contribution pension 
plans. When the statute was enacted, however, such plans were a relatively 
minor part of the pension landscape. Because there are some uncertainties 
associated with any pension plan arrangement, Congress subjected defined 
contribution arrangements to some of the rules it had designed to govern 
defined benefit pension plans.
116
 The uncertainties associated with the 
modern defined contribution pension arrangement, however, are markedly 
different from those associated with a traditional pension plan. 
Conceptualizing the Promise. To the uninitiated, the phrase ―defined 
contribution‖ arrangement may prompt the question: who is contributing 
what to what? The simple answer: an employee is contributing some of 
her current compensation (which conceptually includes an employer‘s 
matching contribution) to an individual investment account.
117
 The simple 
answer, however, does not immediately reveal what, if anything, the 
promisor is agreeing to do. Logically, a defined contribution pension 
arrangement is comprised of two promises. First, the employer promises to 
make contributions of a certain amount to an employee‘s account.118 
Second, the employer promises to have some involvement in connection 
with the administiration or investment of that account or both.
119
 
 
 
Plans (May 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1141918. For a 
comprehensive economic analysis of an analogous issue in the non-retirement-plan setting, see MARK 
J. WARSHAWSKY, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 10 (1992) (evaluating two 
policy options: ―the status quo and ‗ERISA-fication‘‖). 
 115. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 116. See, e.g., supra notes 92, 93, 100, 101 and accompanying text. 
 117. Some arrangements couple an employee‘s pretax wage contribution with a employer match, 
but, functionally, the total ―contribution‖ is all employee compensation. In economic terms, the match 
represents foregone wages. See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining that all benefits are wage 
substitutes). 
 118. This is true even where there is no matching contribution; in that case, the employer is 
promising to administer the transfer of the employee contribution. 
 119. Were neither of these the case, the arrangement would not be a bilateral benefit promise. It 
would be an individual tax-preferred savings plan self-administered by the employee who self-funded 
with wages. 
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The first promise—an agreement to contribute—is similar to the 
formula promise in a defined benefit pension plan. Because it is extremely 
simple, the promise to contribute poses little performance and expectation 
uncertainty. Likewise, legal rules designed to enforce this promise are 
unlikely to cause meaningful collective uncertainty. The second promise—
related to account involvement—presents a considerably different mix of 
uncertainties. Broadly speaking, it implicates what we refer to as 
―fiduciary‖ considerations.120 
Fiduciary relationships arise in situations where a principal wishes to 
engage an agent to act on her behalf, but is unwilling or unable to engage 
in sufficient monitoring of the agent‘s activities to ensure the agent is 
faithfully serving the principal‘s interest.121 Frequently, an agent possesses 
expertise, training, or capability that the principal lacks. This makes 
reliable monitoring challenging. In lieu of direct monitoring, a fiduciary 
bargain can be struck, pursuant to which the agent agrees to assume 
particular duties to the principal. Alternatively, there are circumstances 
where law, in the absence of a bargain, imposes fiduciary duties on parties 
with a certain type of relationship.
122
 In either case, it is often too costly or 
difficult to specify in advance how, precisely, a fiduciary should act on the 
principal‘s behalf. Accordingly, whether arising by agreement or by law, 
fiduciary relationships are routinely defined by various standards of 
conduct that have been developed to clarify a fiduciary‘s duties.123 
 
 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 115 (identifying the relevance of fiduciary duties in some 
defined benefit pension plan disputes). 
 121. We use principal and agent in the economic sense—where Party A engages Party B to act on 
Party A‘s behalf—not the formal legal sense, where control is an element of agency. 
 122. To what extent such duties are subject to change by agreement is a matter of much academic 
debate. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
595, 598 (1997).  
The conditions that generate state-imposed fiduciary restrictions not only impel limits on the 
fiduciary‘s power, but they impel limits on the beneficiary‘s power . . . to consent to departure 
from those restrictions. Those limits are more rigorous than the limits on the non-
beneficiary‘s power to consent to departure from the restrictions of ―mere‖ contract doctrine. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH L. REV. 1 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Tamar Frankel, 
Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of 
Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
491 (2004). 
 123. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 
303, 303 (1999) (―Fiduciary law delineates the ways in which such relationships arise and identifies 
the standards of conduct to which a fiduciary must conform, including requirements of loyalty, zeal, 
and self-sacrifice.‖). 
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In virtually all defined contribution pension plans, promisees rely on 
plan fiduciaries to perform functions that are too difficult or costly for 
promisees to perform on their own.
124
 While some fiduciary obligations, 
such as the restrictions on ―prohibited transactions,‖ have been expressed 
in sets of fairly clear rules,
125
 the core aspects of fiduciary duties under 
ERISA are expressed and applied as standards—such as the duty to act 
―solely in the interest of beneficiaries‖ and the duty to prudently 
administer the plan.
126
 Few, if any, promisees understand with confidence 
what such duties mean in a circumstance-specific way.
127
 Accordingly, 
these fiduciary promises are particularly susceptible to expectation 
uncertainty.
128
 
Uncertainty Implications. The expectation uncertainty that permeates 
fiduciary promises may lead to collective uncertainty. Whether the 
 
 
 124. For defined contribution plans that do not offer the option of investment self-direction, the 
promisor‘s fiduciary role is obvious and enormous: the fiduciary is actively deciding how to invest 
assets beneficially owned by the plan participant. But even for plans that do offer self-directed 
accounts (and with respect to promisees who exercise that option), residual fiduciary duties remain. 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2006). 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006). ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who ―has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration‖ of a pension or welfare plan. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(21)(A)(iii) (2006). It subjects every fiduciary to a general duty of loyalty by providing that he 
―shall discharge his duties . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and 
their beneficiaries . . . and . . . defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.‖ 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1). Similarly, it subjects every fiduciary to a general duty of care by providing that he ―shall 
discharge his duties . . . with the care, skill prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use.‖ 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 127. For example, in plans where the participants do not self-direct their investments, they may 
have little or no understanding of what it means for the fiduciary to be investing prudently. Even in 
plans where the participants select their own investments, there may be considerable expectation 
uncertainty because of the fiduciary relationship. For example, participants in such a plan may have 
little or no understanding of the size and prudence of various fees the fiduciary negotiates with 
essential third parties (i.e., financial intermediaries). 
 128. Some prominent theorists have described the fiduciary relationship as an example of a 
―relational‖ or ―incomplete‖ contract. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1127 (1981) (arguing that fiduciary relationships ―are properly 
analyzed as relational contracts because they tend to be characterized by uncertainty about factual 
conditions during performance and an extraordinary degree of difficulty in describing specifically the 
desired adaptations to contingencies‖). In our view, analysis of ERISA fiduciary law could benefit 
greatly from consideration of the well-developed literature regarding incomplete contracts. See, e.g., 
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, 
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Subha Narasimhan, Of 
Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1123 (1986). In 
exploring the regulation of ERISA-governed health benefits, at least one notable scholar has 
persuasively drawn from this literature. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care 
“Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999) (recognizing the incomplete nature of the health insurance contract and 
arguing that certain benefit mandates may, therefore, be economically efficient). 
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fiduciary is the promisor itself or a party working with the promisor to 
administer the defined contribution plan, a legal regime designed to 
protect individual promisees—by construing strictly and broadly the 
fiduciary obligations—is likely to discourage players from wishing to 
serve as fiduciaries, or, alternatively, cause them to charge more for doing 
so. Thus, ―fiduciary chill‖ is a legitimate concern when selecting legal 
rules governing fiduciary conduct. There are, however, measures that may 
efficiently mitigate ―fiduciary chill.‖ For example, it is sometimes possible 
to couple strongly protective liability rules with ―safe harbor‖ carve outs 
(i.e., ex ante statutory descriptions of circumstances in which the fiduciary 
obligation is eliminated or significantly limited).
129
 Put simply, the 
objective is to reduce the scope of conduct governed by standards by 
subjecting a commonly recurring fact pattern to classic rules.
130
 
A Wrinkle Returns. There is one fiduciary issue that, as mentioned 
above, recurs across ERISA promises: misrepresentation. Whatever the 
underlying promise, such disputes arise when (i) a promisee seeks advice 
from the fiduciary about either the content of the benefit or the 
consequences of a benefit-related action or decision, (ii) the fiduciary 
provides inaccurate or incomplete advice, and (iii) the promisee relies on it 
to her detriment.
131
 The challenge is determining what legal rules should 
apply in such cases. Weakly protective rules may have devastating 
consequences in performance and expectation uncertainty terms.
132
 On the 
 
 
 129. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). Pursuant to this safe harbor, the fiduciary obligations 
of a promisor are vastly reduced in cases where the promisee is directing her own defined contribution 
plan investments. There are disputes, of course, about what residual fiduciary duties remain. But 
disputes on the margins pose less collective uncertainty than would be present in the absence of a safe 
harbor. 
 130. Whether converting the fiduciary standard to a specialized rule is desirable in any particular 
circumstance is, of course, a separate question. The predictability of any rule may be outweighed by 
the loss of flexibility inherent in the fiduciary standard. Moreover, one might challenge the likelihood 
that government officials will select a desirable rule. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, 
Controlling the Cost of Medical Care: A Dose of Deregulation 1 (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158547 (―We take seriously the insights of the 
Hayekian tradition that decentralized market actors are better able to identify and use relevant 
information than a single sclerotic government agency that is beset with administrative and political 
problems of its own.‖). And some matters are so dependent on idiosyncratic factual specifics that a 
useful standard to rule conversion would be functionally impossible. Put simply, efforts to convert 
ERISA‘s fiduciary promise into one that relies entirely on contract principles are misguided. Cf. 
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 
880 (―My thesis is that, even considering the obligation‘s elusive nature, descriptions drawn 
exclusively from contract principles are surely mistaken.‖). 
 131. See, e.g., Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 2007) (employee was 
told that he was not required to be an active employee in order to receive benefits; upon his death, his 
widow was denied benefits on the grounds that he was not an active employee). 
 132. This is true because fiduciaries may have insufficient incentive to exercise care in dispensing 
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other hand, strongly protective rules may increase collective 
uncertainty.
133
 Arguably, these increased costs will be substantial because 
misrepresentation allegations, especially if, in part, oral, may be costly to 
disprove. 
C. Welfare Benefit Promise Uncertainty 
As noted above, ERISA was not confined to the regulation of pension 
plans. The inclusion of welfare plans within the statute is often described 
by scholars as an ―afterthought,‖ whose regulatory consequences were 
hardly contemplated by legislators who had devoted years to examining 
pension reform.
134
 
Self-evident is that welfare plan promises—which supply life, 
disability, and, most importantly, health insurance—are of a different 
character entirely than retirement promises and implicate different 
uncertainties. Below, we focus on the uncertainties that attend the health 
insurance promise, because nowhere are the unanticipated consequences 
of ERISA‘s welfare plan regulation more severe. Indeed, it is no 
overstatement to say that the collective uncertainty associated with 
application of ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions to employer-
sponsored health insurance has fundamentally transformed the practical 
effect of the statute in numerous areas. There is simply no chance that the 
path of the law would have unfolded as it did if health insurance promises 
had been excluded from the statute‘s dominion. In order to appreciate this 
reality, we need to first understand the nature of health insurance in 
America today. Such will illuminate how and why employer-sponsored 
health insurance presents a unique and powerful mix of uncertainties. 
 
 
advice. Accordingly, fiduciary conduct (or inaction) may result in promisees actively forming 
mistaken expectations about the content or consequences of the benefit promise. See, e.g., Griggs v. 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 374–76 (4th Cir. 2001) (fiduciary told employee that 
he could receive a lump sum early retirement distribution tax-deferred but failed to notify him when it 
found out that a tax-deferred lump sum was not permitted under federal laws). 
 133. This is true for two reasons. First, exposure to civil liability (for advice that can be attacked 
ex post as imperfect) may reduce the willingness of promisors to authorize their agents to discuss the 
meaning of the plans with promisees. This chilling of communication may be perceived as undesirable 
because, in most cases, the fiduciary will have correctly explained to the promisee a plan condition or 
consequence that the promisee did not previously understand. Second, exposure to civil liability (for 
advice that can be attacked ex post as imperfect) may increase the cost of plan administration. Put 
simply, fiduciaries may continue to give advice but price into their services the expected cost of the 
increased liability. In the case of a fiduciary-promisor, this increased cost merely takes the form of a 
reduction in the generosity of the initial promise. 
 134. Hyman & Hall, supra note 87; see also supra note 87. 
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The Health Insurance Promise. Insurance is a hedge against risk where 
one agrees to incur a small certain loss (the premium) in order to protect 
against a large uncertain loss (the loss-payout event). To oversimplify, 
willingness to pay an insurance premium depends upon the likelihood of 
the loss-payout event, the magnitude of the loss payout, and the insured‘s 
level of risk aversion. 
Consider ―dice insurance.‖ If one had to pay six dollars should a fair 
die come up ―6,‖ what would one pay to insure against the loss? The 
likelihood of loss is 1/6; the magnitude of the loss is minus six dollars. A 
fair premium is one dollar, plus some amount corresponding to one‘s risk 
aversion regarding a six dollar loss. Most people, relative to a six dollar 
loss, are risk neutral, and thus would not be willing to pay more than a one 
dollar premium. At the risk of stating the obvious, health insurance is far 
more complex. In dice insurance, the calculus is straightforward: one 
knows precisely how much money one needs to address the loss event, as 
well as the likelihood of the loss event. 
Health insurance is a considerably more difficult bet because very few 
individuals know the average cost of treatment they will need should they 
become ill or the likelihood of getting ill. Therefore, they will be unable to 
calculate an actuarially fair premium based on their expected treatment 
cost. Nor do they have any sense of the variance associated with any ex 
ante estimates of either of those two inputs. So they will be unable to 
determine the additional risk premium they are willing to pay.
135
 
Practically speaking, then, a potential insured lacks the ability to calculate 
the expected cost to ―fix‖ herself if sick or to determine how much that 
expected cost will vary. Accordingly, she cannot price insurance using a 
straightforward calculus. 
What a potential insured can do, presumably, is estimate a ―reservation 
price premium‖ by determining the highest premium she would pay in 
exchange for an insurance deal that promised to restore her health (within 
the limits of modern medicine) in the event she becomes sick. In a 
decently functioning market with informed insurers, a buyer armed only 
with an idiosyncratic reservation price (but one that is, unknown to the 
 
 
 135. Assume a potential insured determines that the likelihood of getting sick in the coming year 
is 20%, and the average cost of treatment is $200. An actuarially fair premium is .2 x 200, or $40. Of 
course, the various illnesses one could get vary widely. As such, the cost of treatment varies 
enormously. Without knowing the extent of such variance, one would have little basis upon which to 
reasonably calculate the additional risk premium one was willing to pay. Cognitive biases, of course, 
complicate the matter further. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1218 (2003) (discussing cognitive biases in insurance 
purchasing). 
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buyer, in fact reasonable) can still strike something approximating an 
actuarially fair deal by initiating a result-specific reverse auction (i.e., ―I 
would like to buy insurance from whomever gives me the best price on the 
following promise: you will give me whatever income I need to pay the 
cost of medical services needed to remediate any adverse medical state‖). 
Insurers will compete to offer the best price, based on their respective 
calculations of the relevant inputs.
136
 If the best seller price is lower than a 
potential insured‘s reservation price, then an insurance deal premised on 
―medical necessity‖ will be struck—with the insured never having made 
anything other than the vaguest expected loss calculation or assessment of 
his risk aversion.
137
 
Uncertainty Implications. It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of 
expectation uncertainty associated with the promise of ―medically 
necessary‖ care. To put it mildly, it dwarfs the expectation uncertainty 
present in all other benefit promises. Accordingly, promisees regularly 
assert claims for medical care that are denied.
138
 And these administrative 
claims frequently lead to civil litigation in which courts must then 
ascertain the circumstance-specific meaning of ―medical necessity.‖139 
The health insurance promise is highly volatile because impartial 
arbiters often disagree about several important aspects of the necessity 
standard.
140
 In addition, because a promise of medically necessary care 
does not explicitly include a marginal cost limitation, there is relentless 
upward cost pressure on the promise. To the extent that medically 
 
 
 136. Actual insurance markets are vastly more complicated; we, of course, do not claim every 
potential insured is in fact conducting a reverse auction. In the ERISA context, matters are additionally 
complicated because insurance selection involves the employer, whose interests are not perfectly 
aligned with those of the employees. Such complications do not concern us here; we are simply 
illustrating how insurance deals can be struck when it is obvious that insureds have not made ex ante 
actuarial calculations that resemble dice insurance calculations. 
 137. Moreover, such a deal is consistent with social norms always and everywhere promoting the 
supremacy of health among life‘s circumstances. 
 138. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008) (citation omitted) 
(noting that approximately ―1.9 million beneficiaries of ERISA plans have health care claims denied 
each year‖). 
 139. See JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION 544 (2d ed. 2005) (―Many 
cases involving medical benefit denials concern the issue of whether a treatment is medically 
necessary.‖); see also id. at 542 (―Medical plans typically exclude experimental and investigational 
treatments. There has been a significant amount of litigation regarding treatments that insurers have 
characterized as experimental and therefore not reimbursable.‖); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s 
Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health 
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 599 (2003) (―explor[ing] the concept of medical necessity as it has 
evolved in the judicial and administrative oversight of managed care‖). 
 140. This volatility is arguably increased because impartial arbiters may be emotionally biased in 
favor of individuals seeking care. 
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necessary care is held to encompass any potentially beneficial care, 
irrespective of its marginal cost,
141
 an insured—who is insulated from the 
marginal cost—has strong incentive to demand it.142 Health-care 
professionals have strong incentives to recommend such goods and 
services without regard for cost-adjusted utility.
143
 And, as a result, 
entrepreneurs have strong incentives to create them. The resulting process 
drives up the price of health care, with corresponding upward pressure on 
insurance premiums.
144
 
Rising health-care prices unquestionably threaten the vitality of 
employer-provided health insurance. Accordingly, legal rules perceived as 
contributing to price inflation pose significant collective uncertainty. For 
example, the volatility and cost of the health insurance promise are 
increased by the availability of punitive damages or recovery for 
 
 
 141. A unit of medical care (e.g., a drug, surgery, or diagnostic procedure) that does five 
peppercorns of good is arguably more ―necessary‖ than one that does four peppercorns of good, 
irrespective of the potentially steep cost of the fifth peppercorn. 
 142. As one noted economist recognized over forty years ago, total indemnity creates what is now 
commonly referred to as ex post moral hazard: insureds facing a loss event will choose the ―fix‖ most 
consistent with their preferences without regard to cost. See Mark V. Pauly, Comment, The Economics 
of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968). Instead of ―moral hazard,‖ we prefer the more 
neutral term ―discretionary cost pressure.‖ See generally JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND 
FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2003) (arguing that some additional health care purchased because of 
income transfers when ill is, in fact, worth more to the consumer than it costs to produce and therefore 
a welfare gain). 
 143. Insofar as the extent of a triggering loss and possible fixes are not readily ascertainable, an 
expert (i.e., physician) will need to be engaged in connection with performance of the indemnity. The 
expert, as an agent, may have interests divergent from both the insurer and the insured, and thus 
presents the possibility that he will act in ways injurious to one or both. How the expert is incentivized 
and monitored, of course, matters with regard to the ways in which self-interested behavior will 
materialize; expert engagement arrangements can be structured to be more likely to favor the insured 
or the insurer. For example, a common critique of the fee-for-service model dominant in health care 
until recently was that physicians routinely charged for unnecessary services to enrich themselves and 
to please cost-indifferent patients. A common critique of the capitation model dominant in HMO 
health care—where physicians are paid a flat fee to provide a predetermined type of care—is that 
doctors underprovide care (i.e., ―stint‖) once the capitation fee is consumed. See, e.g., Randall P. Ellis 
& Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Payment Systems for Health Services, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 375 (1990) 
(advancing, inter alia, an important theory of stinting); Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 
Provider Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing and Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 
129 (1986) (same). 
 144. Health-economics literature abounds with proposals to control costs. In recent years, the most 
common method of cost control has probably been explicit cost-sharing mechanisms such as 
deductibles and coinsurance. Of course, these mechanisms have clear limitations. For example, any 
such measure must be capped or it is insufficiently attractive to rational risk-averse players. 
Accordingly, for demands above the cap, explicit cost sharing will not constrain the selection of more 
costly fixes by an insured. Perhaps more importantly, cost sharing worries many observers because of 
the specific types of foregone consumption that it has been proven to induce. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. 
NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE CONUNDRUM 79–103 (2002). 
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emotional distress caused by wrongful coverage decisions.
145
 Therefore, 
limiting remedies will reduce the cost of making the health insurance 
promise. So, too, would adoption of judicial review standards that favor 
coverage judgments made by the promisor or its agent. The selection of 
legal rules in this area requires a delicate balancing of many important 
considerations.
146
 A studied (and ideally legislative) assessment of whether 
the collective uncertainty associated with any given legal rule (e.g., 
limiting civil remedies) is outweighed by concerns regarding competing 
uncertainties is necessary.
147
 
IV. UNCERTAINTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Much legal scholarship has addressed the manner in which ERISA 
should be interpreted by the federal judiciary.
148
 And no object of judicial 
interpretation has generated more interest among scholars than the 
complex private right of action created by the statute.
149
 In this Part, we 
 
 
 145. There are volatility concerns even in the context of ―physical‖ consequential injuries (i.e., a 
worsened physical condition). The likelihood of such consequences varies widely and is 
extraordinarily difficult to predict. Cf. McCahill v. N.Y. Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616 (N.Y. 1911) (man 
dies from delirium tremens while hospitalized from car accident). Moreover, it is often difficult to 
assess whether the consequential injury was partially, or entirely, the result of something other than the 
benefit denial or delay. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal 
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). 
 146. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Expanded Managed Care Liability: What Impact on 
Employer Coverage?, 18 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8 (1999) (noting that the rules in this context may effect 
―coverage decision making, information exchange, risk contracting, and the extent of employers‘ 
involvement in health coverage‖). 
 147. For example, it is likely that the limitation of remedies available to victims of wrongful 
benefit denial or delay will significantly increase performance uncertainty. See Stris, supra note 30, at 
396–97 (outlining the argument). Promisors who are not exposed to any consequential damages for 
wrongful denial are considerably more likely to engage in opportunistic or careless behavior. See, e.g., 
id. at 398 n.56 (noting resolution of a recent controversy where the largest disability insurer in the 
United States agreed to reexamine more than 200,000 disability claims that it had denied). While we 
believe that the case for consequential damages in this context is strong, our even stronger belief is 
this: prohibiting traditional consequential damages as a cost-control measure is like using a bucket to 
bail out the Titanic. Arresting the rising cost of health care requires sweeping changes in how health 
care is delivered, administered, and financed. Selecting remedial legal rules to govern the promise of 
employer-sponsored health insurance is merely one small part of that larger discussion. 
 148. See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 37, at 1107 (arguing that ―the mess in ERISA 
fiduciary law cannot be ameliorated until courts . . . recognize the multiplicity of interests that inhere 
in the modern pension and employee benefit trust‖); Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of 
Managed Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 460 
(2003) (arguing that ―the Supreme Court, in interpreting ERISA, rather than Congress in drafting it, 
. . . is most responsible for the current confused and illogical state of managed care law‖); Dana M. 
Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA’s Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV. 201, 242 (1995) 
(arguing ―that the protections of section 510 [of ERISA] should extend to plant closing situations‖). 
 149. See infra notes 154, 155. 
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employ our theory of uncertainty to explain the allure and persistence of 
the Court‘s maligned doctrinal approach to private civil enforcement. We 
argue that, when given the opportunity, the Court has exploited textual 
ambiguity to give voice to a profound fear of collective uncertainty. It has 
done so by admittedly developing several restrictive ―judicial glosses.‖150 
A. Civil Enforcement 
The particulars of civil enforcement under ERISA defy concise 
summary, but the essential provisions can be described generally as 
follows: A ―benefits‖ provision creates a private right of action through 
which a participant in any pension or welfare plan may seek benefits due 
under the plan.
151
 A ―fiduciary‖ provision creates a private right of action 
through which a participant in any pension or welfare plan may police the 
conduct of those who administer her plan.
152
 Finally, a ―catchall‖ 
provision creates a private right of action though which various 
stakeholders may seek to obtain ―other appropriate equitable relief.‖153 
Because of their extraordinary practical importance, these provisions 
have regularly captured the attention of the United States Supreme Court. 
 
 
 150. At one oral argument, Chief Justice John Roberts candidly remarked: ―you‘re right that we 
judicially have developed a number of glosses on [ERISA], including I think most importantly the 
Firestone deference principle. But if you‘re right [in your current interpretation], then all of that work 
has been in vain.‖ Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 
S. Ct. 1020 (2008) (No. 06-856), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/06-856.pdf (responding to Professor Stris‘s claim that the plain meaning of an 
ERISA provision should not be trumped by a ―judicial gloss‖ on the statute). These judicial glosses, 
wholly apart from their effect on the regulatory system, provide an important vehicle for assessing the 
relationship between Congress and the federal courts. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme 
Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 346–51 (2002) (discussing Great-West Life & 
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The 
Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 256–58 (2003) (same). 
 151. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006) (authorizing a participant in an ERISA plan to file a 
civil action to ―recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan‖); see also 
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
 152. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (authorizing a civil action to recover ―appropriate relief‖); 29 
U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (defining appropriate relief for purposes of § 1132(a)(2) to include restoration 
by a fiduciary of ―any losses to the plan resulting from [fiduciary breach]‖); see also LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 
U.S. 134 (1985); supra note 126 (discussing ERISA‘s definition of fiduciary and codification of broad 
duties of loyalty and prudence). 
 153. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (authorizing a civil action to recover ―appropriate equitable relief‖ 
to redress violations of the statute or the terms of the ERISA plan at issue); see, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid 
Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 
204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); cf. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 
(1996). 
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For nearly two decades, scholars have sharply criticized the Court for its 
jurisprudence in this area. The most prominent critic has been Yale Law 
School Professor John H. Langbein.
154
 But he is hardly alone.
155
 In the 
sections that follow, we apply our theory to several of these important 
Supreme Court decisions. 
B. Limiting Remedies 
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Russell.
156
 At issue was the plight of Doris Russell, a 
Massachusetts Mutual employee suffering from a back ailment. Ms. 
Russell initially received disability insurance payments for her condition 
from an ERISA-governed welfare plan.
157
 After several months, however, 
these benefits were terminated based on the report of an examining 
physician.
158
 Ms. Russell pursued internal review of the denial; several 
months later, she was able to persuade the plan to reinstate her benefits 
 
 
 154. For example, in 1991, Professor Langbein wrote that a decision penned by Justice O‘Connor 
was ―such a crude piece of work that one may well question whether it had the full attention of the 
Court.‖ Langbein, supra note 43, at 228 (criticizing the Court‘s decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)). He went so far as to question the Court‘s commitment to 
competent adjudication of ERISA cases. He wrote: 
I do not believe that either Justice O‘Connor or her colleagues who joined this unanimous 
opinion would have uttered such doctrinal hash if they had been seriously engaged in the 
enterprise. 
 . . . If the Court is bored with the detail of supervising complex bodies of statutory law, 
thought should be given to having that job done by a court that would take it seriously. 
Langbein, supra note 43, at 228–29 (footnote omitted); see also John H. Langbein, What ERISA 
Means By “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1365 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, Trail of Error] (arguing that ―[t]he 
Supreme Court needs to confess its error in ERISA remedy law, much as it has recently confronted its 
mishandling of ERISA preemption‖). 
 155. On the issue of limited remedies, see, for example, Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of 
Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 667–68 (1994); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual 
Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 665 (1994); Maher, supra note 
49, at 679–81; Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA 
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 461 (2000) [hereinafter Muir, Perversity of ERISA]; 
Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1612–14 (2002); 
David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the 
Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 23 (2004). On the issue of judicial 
review, see generally Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA: No Further Inquiry Into Conflicted 
Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 637 (2005); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-
thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West—Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a 
Jury Trial in Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629 (2004); Kathyrn J. Kennedy, 
Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083 (2001). 
 156. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).  
 157. Id. at 136.  
 158. Id.  
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and make retroactive payments for the period during which they had been 
improperly withheld.
159
 Nonetheless, Ms. Russell filed a civil lawsuit.
160
 
She sought consequential damages for the financial distress and 
aggravation of her medical condition that she alleged arose from the 
several-month period during which benefits were improperly withheld.
161
 
Her lawsuit relied exclusively on ERISA‘s ―fiduciary‖ provision, which, 
as noted above, permits recovery for fiduciary breach in connection with 
plan operation.
162
 
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that Ms. 
Russell could not use the fiduciary provision to obtain consequential 
damages for her temporary benefit denial.
163
 This was not surprising 
because her interpretation of that provision found little support in the plain 
text or legislative history of the statute. As the Court noted, its purpose 
was to impose personal liability on an administrator for ―losses to the 
plan.‖164 
Russell should have been a straightforward decision with limited 
significance because Ms. Russell relied solely on the ―fiduciary‖ 
provision. In dicta that was subsequently and colorfully described by 
Professor Langbein as the beginning of a ―Trail of Error,‖165 however, 
Justice Stevens broadly asserted that ERISA ―says nothing about the 
recovery of extracontractual damages‖ in connection with benefit denial or 
delay.
166
 Because Ms. Russell disclaimed use of the ―catchall‖ provision, 
the Court expressly reserved judgment on whether consequential damages 
would be recoverable under that provision of the statute.
167
 Nonetheless, 
Russell was widely read as meaning that, absent some loss to the plan, 
consequential damages in connection with benefit delay or denial are not 
 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 137.  
 161. Id. at 137–38. 
 162. See supra note 152 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2006)). Ms. Russell had also asserted 
state-law claims, but they were held preempted. Russell, 473 U.S. at 137. 
 163. Id. at 138. 
 164. Id. at 140 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006)). According to Justice 
Stevens, a ―contextual reading of the statute‖ confirmed that the fiduciary provision was ―primarily 
concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets . . . rather than with the rights of an individual 
beneficiary.‖ Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. 
 165. Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 154.  
 166. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144. 
 167. Id. at 139 n.5 (―Because respondent relies entirely on [the fiduciary provision], and expressly 
disclaims reliance on [the catchall provision], we have no occasion to consider whether any other 
provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of extracontractual damages.‖). 
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available to a promisee; all that is recoverable is the value of the promised 
benefits.
168
  
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,
169
 the Court addressed the issue that it 
expressly left open in Russell. Mertens involved a claim against third-party 
actuaries (Hewitt) of the Kaiser Steel Corporation (Kaiser) pension plan. 
The plaintiffs, retired employees of Kaiser, alleged that Hewitt had failed 
to modify its actuarial adjustments in connection with Kaiser plant 
shutdowns, leaving the plan with insufficient funds to meet the demands 
of Kaiser retirees.
170
 They sued Hewitt, inter alia, under the ―catchall 
provision.‖171  
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court‘s five-to-four majority, produced 
an opinion that remains surprising. Resurrecting the ancient law and equity 
distinction, Justice Scalia concluded that the catchall provision‘s reference 
to ―appropriate equitable relief‖ solely authorized ―relief . . . typically 
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not 
compensatory damages).‖172 In contrast, Mertens and the United States (as 
amicus curiae) had urged that ―appropriate equitable relief‖ simply meant 
―whatever relief a court of equity [was] employed to provide in the 
particular case at issue‖173—with there being no dispute that premerger 
courts of equity had affirmative power to and often did award 
compensatory damages in connection with breaches of trust.
174
 Indeed, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that ―equitable relief‖ could ―assuredly 
mean‖ precisely what Mertens and the United States proposed.175 
Nonetheless, he concluded that ―in the context of the present statute,‖ 
 
 
 168. Although dicta, the lower courts interpreted the broad language in Russell to mean that 
consequential damages are not available in actions brought to recover benefits due under the plan. See 
Flint, supra note 155, at 621 (noting that, as a result of dicta in Russell, ―many subsequent courts have 
concluded, without examining the legislative history, that ERISA forecloses traditional contractual 
remedies permitting recovery of extracontractual damages in the benefits-due lawsuit‖); see also supra 
note 151 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006)). Today, the issue appears settled. See Muir, 
Perversity of ERISA, supra note 155, at 436 (―Without exception, the benefits enforcement section has 
been construed to permit only the recovery of benefits due under a plan.‖). 
 169. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).  
 170. Id. at 250. 
 171. Id. The catchall provision does not specify who may be sued. In Mertens, the parties did not 
dispute that the cause of action could be asserted against Hewitt; rather, the dispute was exclusively 
over what relief was available. Id. at 251. The Court expressed some skepticism as to whether the 
catchall provision could properly be used to sue a party in Hewitt‘s position but nonetheless ―decide[d] 
th[e] case on the narrow battlefield the parties have chosen, and reserve[d] decision [on the] antecedent 
question.‖ Id. at 254–55. 
 172. Id. at 256. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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Congress intended to limit relief to such as was ―typically‖ available in 
equity.
176
 
Standing together, Russell and Mertens severely limited, if not erased, 
the right of an ERISA beneficiary to recover consequential damages in 
connection with benefit denials or fiduciary breaches.
177
 While both 
decisions engage in extensive consideration of ERISA‘s statutory text, 
there is no serious disagreement that, at best, the Court‘s holdings in both 
cases are plausible, rather than decisive, readings of ambiguous 
language.
178
 On doctrinal grounds, scholarly disapproval of the Court‘s 
decisions is widespread.
179
 As Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly noted, it 
strains credulity to conclude that the ninety-third Congress aimed to 
provide a limited remedy reliant on a working knowledge of fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century precedent.
180
 
In our view, both opinions are more fully understood as the work of a 
Court troubled by the collective uncertainty associated with the legal rules 
they rejected.
181
 Consider Russell: a right to recover consequential 
 
 
 176. Id. The Court affirmed its historical approach in Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 
U.S. 356 (2006), and Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). In both 
cases, the issue was what particular conditions equity imposed on an insurer‘s recovery of tort 
proceeds from an insured. For a comprehensive discussion of tort subrogation, see Brendan S. Maher 
& Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 49, 79–82 (2008). 
 177. One exception is that if a fiduciary breach causes a loss to the plan or a gain to the fiduciary, 
the plan may seek restoration of losses or disgorgement of gains. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & 
Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008) (construing the ―fiduciary‖ remedy); see also Linda Greenhouse, 
Top Court Allows Suit Over 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at C1 (―With 70 million people 
holding about $3 trillion in 401(k) investments, the 9-to-0 decision [in LaRue] was one of the most 
important rulings in years on the meaning of the federal pension law . . . .‖). In addition, the scope of 
the catchall provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court—that is, what manner of relief was 
―typically‖ available in equity—is still unresolved. Equitable remedies such as ―surcharge‖ may, in 
certain narrow circumstances, function as a compensatory damage analogue. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (―If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with . . . 
any loss or depredation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust.‖). 
 178. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting) (―The majority candidly acknowledges 
that it is plausible to interpret the phrase ‗appropriate equitable relief‘ as used in [the catchall 
provision] . . . as meaning that relief which was available in the courts of equity for a breach of 
trust.‖); see also Maher, supra note 49, at 672 (discussing textual construction of the ―benefits‖ 
provision). 
 179. See supra notes 154, 155 and accompanying text. 
 180. In a recent oral argument, Justice Ginsburg pointedly asked: ―Do you really think that 
Congress had in mind the distinction that you are now drawing in the ring case based on 15th and 16th 
century English precedent?‖ Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 
547 U.S. 356 (2005) (No. 05-260), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/05-206.pdf (questioning Professor Stris regarding his answer to a hypothetical 
posed by Justice Breyer). 
 181. In Mertens, Justice Scalia rather weakly defended the majority‘s construction of the catchall 
provision as ―not nonsensical,‖ and explained that the rule urged by Mertens would ―impose high 
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damages in connection with welfare benefit denial or delay implicates 
massive collective uncertainty. The underlying benefit promise is 
undeniably volatile and, particularly in the health-care context, trends 
relentlessly upward in terms of cost.
182
 If, in the event of an improper 
denial, a promisor (or an affiliated fiduciary) were subject to consequential 
damages, the average payout and outcome volatility associated with an 
insurance promise could increase considerably. Eliminating recovery for 
consequential damages addresses that concern.
183
 
Consider Mertens: at issue in that case was the relief available for what 
was functionally a fiduciary breach in connection with plan 
administration.
184
 Fiduciary conduct rules, as we have explained, can be 
volatile and pose significant collective uncertainty, particularly so in 
certain circumstances. If the damages for such conduct are limited to 
Mertens-bounded ―equitable‖ relief (such as restitution, i.e., the return of 
an ill-gotten discrete amount, or injunctive relief, as opposed to traditional 
―legal‖ consequential damages), the costs of breach are constrained and 
collective uncertainty concerns assuaged.  
The downside, however, is that the Court‘s limitation of the catchall 
provision also results in heightened performance uncertainty. Such may 
not be immediately obvious because the fiduciary provision authorizes 
monetary damages if breach results in a loss to the plan or ill-gotten profits 
to the fiduciary.
185
 But there is a setting in which the Mertens limitation 
 
 
insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence 
upon ERISA plans themselves.‖ Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262. In Russell, Justice Stevens described the 
Court‘s holding as consonant with Congress‘s concern that ―the cost of federal standards [would] 
discourage the growth of private pension plans.‖ Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 
148 n.17 (1985). 
 182. See supra Part III.B–C. Russell was a disability (not health) insurance case. But it strains 
credulity to believe that the Court, in deciding Russell, was not imagining a world filled with plaintiffs 
seeking consequential damages in health care disputes. And health insurance is more volatile than 
disability insurance because disability insurance has a determinate contractual payout. Health 
insurance does not. Moreover, the consequential damages for health coverage denials, for obvious 
reasons, present even greater collective uncertainty than they would in the disability insurance setting. 
 183. As noted above, the elimination of consequential damages will likely heighten performance 
uncertainty; the temptation to engage in strategic or careless denials is stronger when the only risk is 
the modest possibility of a promisee recovering attorneys‘ fees. Even scholars who believe 
reputational concerns do much to police enforcement acknowledge the danger of eliminating such 
damages in the context of health insurance. See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 30, at 643 (noting 
that the arguments in favor of consequential damages have ―considerable force and may in the end be 
convincing‖). 
 184. That Hewitt was not a fiduciary, Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, is immaterial. At issue was the 
relief available regarding a claim asserted to be actionable because it fell short of a fiduciary-like 
standard of care. 
 185. In many cases, then, fiduciary conduct will be appropriately policed, to the extent that the 
breach satisfies one of the fiduciary provision‘s two conditions. 
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results in enormous performance uncertainty: misrepresentations. When a 
fiduciary renders inaccurate advice to a promisee who thereafter relies on 
the advice to her detriment, there often is no loss to the plan and no gain 
by the fiduciary. In such cases, the fiduciary provision simply will not 
apply. And if, as is often the case, the fiduciary misrepresentation did not 
deny the promisee any benefits to which she was contractually entitled, the 
benefits provision will provide no remedy. In these settings, a fiduciary 
may be able to supply careless advice with no consequence.
186
 This result 
has, understandably, troubled observers.
187
 
C. Limiting Review 
The second important judicial gloss upon ERISA‘s private right of 
action concerns the standard of review in benefit disputes. In Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
188
 the Court considered the appropriate 
standard of review in an action over an allegedly improper denial of 
severance benefits in connection with a corporate sale.
189
 Firestone urged 
deferential review (i.e., adoption of the rule that a reviewing court may 
overturn a plan administrator‘s benefit denial only if it was ―arbitrary and 
capricious‖).190 
In an opinion written by Justice O‘Connor, the Court rejected 
Firestone‘s argument and held that the proper standard of review for 
benefit decisions was de novo.
191
 Nonetheless, in a regrettable and 
unnecessary detour, the Court declared that deferential review would be 
required where the plan ―gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary 
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of 
the plan.‖192 The only limit the Firestone Court announced on deferential 
review was that a reviewing court must consider a fiduciary‘s actual 
conflict of interest as ―a ‗facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse 
of discretion.‘‖193 In other words: plans could simply write discretionary 
 
 
 186. See supra note 131 (discussing Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 
2007)). 
 187. See, e.g., Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2007) (Benavides, 
J., concurring) (noting that the facts of the case ―scream out for a remedy,‖ but ERISA does not permit 
relief). 
 188. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
 189. 489 U.S. at 105–06. Firestone was limited to the appropriate standard of review in suits 
premised on the ―benefits‖ remedial provision. The Court ―express[ed] no view as to the appropriate 
standard of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA.‖ Id. at 108. 
 190. Id. at 111–12. 
 191. Id. at 115. 
 192. Id. The detour was unnecessary because the Firestone plan lacked a discretionary provision. 
 193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)). 
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authority—and thus deferential review—into the plan document, and even 
in the presence of a conflict of interest, courts must use an abuse-of-
discretion review, modified in some unspecified way by the presence of 
the conflict. Plan provisions awarding discretion to administrators 
immediately became de riguer. For two decades thereafter, the lower 
courts have struggled to identify in benefits disputes when a conflict of 
interest exists and how such a conflict should be weighed as a ―factor‖ in 
conducting an abuse-of-discretion review.
194
 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,
195
 the Court recently 
addressed both issues. Glenn arose from a denial of disability benefits, 
where an insurer, MetLife (on behalf of employer Sears Roebuck), 
administered and paid benefits.
196
 As an initial matter, the Court 
determined that a fiduciary who both administered the plan and paid 
benefits suffered from a conflict of interest.
197
 Nonetheless, the Court 
declined to disturb Firestone, affirming that, even where a conflict of 
interest is present, the standard of review is one of abuse of discretion.
198
 
The Court attempted to add substance to the ―factor‖ analysis of Firestone 
by explaining that ―circumstances‖ should inform a reviewing court in 
weighing the presence of the conflict; it refused, however, to offer 
―‗talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment.‘‖199 
Because virtually all plans include discretionary provisions, Firestone 
and Glenn supply a de facto deferential standard of review in all lawsuits 
challenging benefit determinations. Such might be a sensible rule were 
benefit determinations customarily made by impartial arbiters. Yet the 
opposite is true under ERISA. Because the statute does not prohibit plan 
sponsors from directly or indirectly controlling those charged with 
administering the plan, conflicted fiduciaries are commonplace.
200
 
That a statute intended to protect promisees would subject the decisions 
of conflicted administrators to weak judicial review is hard to believe.
201
 
 
 
 194. See Bogan & Fu, supra note 155, at 652 n.71 (discussing standards of ―conflict‖ review 
across circuits). 
 195. 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008). 
 196. Id. at 2346–47. 
 197. Id. at 2348 (holding that there is a conflict where ―a plan administrator both evaluates claims 
for benefits and pays benefits claims‖). MetLife had argued that no conflict existed. 
 198. Id. at 2350. 
 199. Id. at 2352 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951)). 
 200. See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 15, at 2297; see also John H. Langbein, Trust Law as 
Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1325 (2007) (―[M]ost ERISA plan benefit denials are the work of 
decisionmakers operating under serious conflicts of interest.‖). 
 201. Employees face many obstacles that limit their ability to bargain fairly. See, e.g., Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-First Century: The Future of Labor 
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But deferential review has the obvious appeal of minimizing collective 
uncertainty. Plan sponsors have assurances that their benefit promises will 
be construed in a manner favorable to them, and challenges to benefit 
determinations may decline as a result of a promisee facing an uphill legal 
battle.
202
 For those disputes that do proceed to litigation, promise volatility 
associated with judicial construction is largely avoided because courts will 
defer absent an abuse of discretion.
203
 Employers are, all things being 
equal, more likely to offer plans and generous benefits when their 
promises are subjected only to deferential review. Of course, deferential 
review also leads to acute performance uncertainty by encouraging self-
serving benefit determinations that fall short of being arbitrary and 
capricious. And it incentivizes promise complexity—and thus heightens 
expectation uncertainty.
204
 Where a promisor‘s construction of a complex 
promise must be accepted by the courts unless it is arbitrary, one would 
expect increasingly complicated promises. 
CONCLUSION 
ERISA is a statutory conglomerate.
205
 It regulates benefit promises so 
different in character that they resemble one another only insofar as they 
share a common nexus to employment. In modern America, these benefit 
promises have enormous social significance: they govern over $5 trillion 
 
 
and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 688–95 (1993) (discussing employee bargaining problems). 
This, indeed, is in part why ERISA was enacted in the first place. Were employees capable of 
negotiating the best deal for themselves, many of ERISA‘s protections would be unnecessary.  
 202. Cf. Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical 
Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1068 (1996) (noting that 
patients often ―find it too expensive or too difficult to pursue their objections through the costly and 
time-consuming judicial process‖).  
 203. The Court recently held that even after an administrator acts arbitrarily and capriciously, the 
administrator does not automatically lose deference by the reviewing court if the administrators had 
simply made an ―honest mistake.‖ See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1649 (2010). Among 
the rationales the Court cited for its decision were efficiency, predictability, and uniformity. Id. at 
1649–51. 
 204. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 205. Coincidentally, its drafting and passage overlapped with a different type of conglomerate. 
See, e.g., Harvey H. Segal, The Urge to Merge: The Time of the Conglomerates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
1968, at SM32. In the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, corporate ―conglomerates‖—entities with disparate 
businesses in largely unconnected market sectors—enjoyed their modern heyday. See CHARLES R. 
SPRUILL, CONGLOMERATES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 1 (1982) (defining conglomerates as 
―firms which face numerous distinct markets, each with its own supply, demand, and profit 
characteristics‖); see also Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 26 (2008) (explaining that in the ‘70s, ―conglomerates became a familiar part of the fabric 
of U.S. business‖). They did not fare well throughout the ‘70s or thereafter. Although some have 
survived, ―conglomerates remain largely discredited.‖ Id. at 27. 
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in retirement funds;
206
 they set forth the terms by which more than 100 
million citizens receive health care;
207
 and they receive approximately 
$250 billion in annual tax subsidization.
208
 The legal rules that govern 
such promises are necessarily of fundamental importance. 
Throughout this Article, we have used uncertainty analysis to challenge 
the notion that ERISA—as currently written, interpreted, and applied—is 
supplying optimal benefit promise rules. The characteristics and likely 
disputes that attend different benefit promises vary widely. As such, any 
thoughtful selection of legal rules must entail identification, weighing, and 
balancing of context-specific uncertainties. For reasons we have 
illustrated, this task is beyond the capability and—as retired Justice David 
Souter made clear—interest of the judiciary.209 
ERISA must be fundamentally reexamined. It was originally passed 
after almost ten years of study involving the paradigmatic benefit promise 
of 1974—the traditional pension.210 The statute has been quite successful 
in meeting its original goals. But the benefit promise has dramatically 
changed in thirty-five years. Consequently, thorough examination of the 
relevant uncertainties in the new benefit promise has never been 
systematically undertaken. Until such examination occurs, continued 
reliance on private promises will unsatisfactorily protect the health and 
retirement security of the American public. 
 
 
 206. See supra note 3. 
 207. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  
 208. See supra notes 2, 61 and accompanying text.  
 209. See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Evan Perez, Justice Souter to Retire From Court, WALL ST. J., May 
1, 2009, at A1 (―Justice Souter has complained about life in Washington and even about aspects of the 
court‘s work, such as the numbingly technical cases involving applications of pension or benefits 
law.‖). 
 210. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (explaining that 
ERISA was enacted after ―almost a decade of studying the Nation‘s private pension plans‖). 
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